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MARKS OF RECTITUDE
Margaret Chon*
INTRODUCTION

We are not used to thinking of trademarks as representing standards
governing products such as cruelty-free cosmetics. But, a tighter and more
transparent connection between standards and marks ought to exist. Since
the Lanham Act was enacted in 1946, and especially since the World Trade
Organization (WTO) came into existence in 1996, private standard setting
has become a popular alternative to public regulation. One commentator
has recently estimated that, since 1995, "more private international foodrelated standards have emerged than in the previous five decades
combined."
Increasingly as well, trademarks, service marks, collective
marks, and certification marks (CMs) (collectively, marks) 2 denote
sustainability standards of some sort, such as fair trade. 3 In this context,
* Donald & Lynda Horowitz Professor for the Pursuit of Justice, Seattle University School
of Law. Thanks to Bob Cumbow, Deven Desai, Daniele Giovannucci, Ellen Goodman,
Gareth Green, Justin Hughes, Sue Jackels, Jack Kirkwood, Dan Ravitcher, Stewart Sterk,
Tony Taubman, and Jane Winn for helpful comments and useful leads. Both the essay and
its title owe their genesis to Errol Meidinger's insights during our joint preparation for the
Law & Society Association Annual Meeting in July 2007. I appreciate the opportunities to
present versions at the Eighth Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Stanford
Law School in August 2008, the Third Access to Knowledge Conference in September 2008,
the When Worlds Collide Symposium at Fordham University School of Law in October
2008, and the Cardozo Intellectual Property Speakers Series in February 2009. I am also
grateful to the organizers of the World Export Development Forum 2008 at the International
Trade Centre for their hospitality. Much gratitude and warmth is felt toward research
assistants Christina Bailey, Debbie Boe, Forrest Carlson, Diana Chaikin, Rob Chang, Kathy
Cho, Jessica Creager, Anne-Marie Marra, Teru Olsen, Van Ngo, Brian Rowe, Jeff Siegmeth,
and Nancy Yamashiro, as well as to Dean Kellye Testy and Vice Dean Annette Clark, for
their support of this project. All mistakes and viewpoints are mine.
1.Daniele Giovannucci, How New Agrifood Standards Are Affecting Trade, in
TRADE-WHAT IF? NEW CHALLENGES IN EXPORT DEVELOPMENT:

CONSUMERS, ETHICS AND

ENVIRONMENT 99, 100 (2008) [hereinafter WHAT IF?].
2. A "trademark" in this essay denotes trademarks and service marks, registered or not.
Collective marks and certification marks (CMS) are treated as separate categories, unless
otherwise noted.
3. Although there is no consensus on this definition, "sustainability standard" in this
essay denotes a standard that addresses some aspect of ethical or fair trade, such as labor or
environmental practices. Both ethical trade and fair trade focus on management of a
product's value chain according to principles of social, environmental, and financial
responsibility, but the latter addresses specifically the trading relationship between the global
North and the global South. Carlos Fortin, International Commerce and Ethical Trade, in
WHAT IF?, supra note 1, at 37, 38.
Through this essay, global "North" is used
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trademark and unfair competition law (collectively, trademark law) 4 can
and already does mediate among various stakeholders and standards in the
global marketplace. Yet, intellectual property scholars have examined the
issues surrounding international standard setting primarily through the
lenses of patent or copyright law. 5 This essay considers afresh the potential
for instruments such as trademarks and certification marks to facilitate
consumer protection and access to quality market information in light of
these new regulatory trends. Marks of rectitude should represent accurately
the standards purported to be embodied within the products (and services)
being purchased by consumers in this disaggregated global marketplace.
Trademark law, typically territorial in its reach, is nonetheless part of a
greater global regulatory regime.
Links to significant international
standard-setting and harmonizing organizations, such as the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO),6 or agreements, such as the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 7 can contribute to sundry
objectives. These include development-oriented trade, sustainable global
production, regulatory harmonization of private standards, and the curbing
of potential market abuses across borders. At a minimum, stronger links
between national and international regulatory regimes may assure that more
private ordering does not result in less public health and safety along global
value (or alternately) supply chains. 8 At best, sustainability standards can
interchangeably with the term "developed countries" and global "South" with "developing
countries."
4. As used in this essay, the term "trademark law" covers federal law as well as the
common law of trademarks and unfair competition.
5. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1889, 1904 (2002) (focusing on patents); Joseph Scott
Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of
the Firm, 40 IND. L. REv. 351 (2007); Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the
Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 623, 628 n.31 (2002) (focusing on
patents but also citing cases on copyright).
6. International
Organization
for
Standardization,
Discover
ISO,
http://www.iso.org/iso/about/discover-isoisos-name.htm
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
Because the acronym for "International Organization for Standardization" would vary across
languages, its founders also gave it the short, "all-purpose" name "ISO." The official U.S.
representative to ISO is the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and its
documents indicate reliance on certification marks without much elaboration of their role in

standard setting.

AM.

NAT'L STANDARDS

INST., NATIONAL CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT

PRINCIPLES FOR THE UNITED STATES 8 (2002), available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/
Documents/News%20and%20Publications/Brochures/NCAP.pdf
7. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex IA, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TBT
Agreement]. See generally Gabrielle Marceau & Joel P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers
to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and PhytosanitaryMeasures Agreement, and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade OrganizationLaw of Domestic
Regulation of Goods, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811 (2002), reprinted with revisions in 18 WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003, at 275 (Federico Ortion & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 2004).
8. Increasingly, health and safety issues along the value or supply chain may be
implicated in standards (melamine contamination in agrifood products or heparin in
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discipline markets by maintaining a floor or even raising the ceiling of
potentially beneficial social activity. For example, private labor standards
reinforce International Labour Organization baselines. 9 In addition,
environmental standards implement climate change technologies such as
the Voluntary Carbon Standards (VCS) for measuring carbon offsets, 10 or
eco-labels for energy-efficient appliances." This standard-setting activity
relies heavily on soft law 12 within a loose treaty framework.
Sustainability standards in particular potentially restructure markets for
farmers or other producers of commodities and goods, as well as third
parties in the global supply or value chains, through the value added to
products from social premiums.' 3 Because they attempt to shape the
pharmaceutical products). Giovannucci, supra note 1, at 99 (estimating five thousand deaths
and seventy-six million illnesses in the United States per year from food-related conditions).
This essay focuses more on labor and environmental standards and less on health and safety
standards, which are subject to different overlapping regulatory regimes, both nationally and
internationally. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferencesfor Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 550, 558-62
(2004) (discussing the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement) on the international level, and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) jurisdiction over
genetically modified organisms and organic foods on the national level).
9. Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The Roles of
Standardization,Certificationand Assurance Services in Global Commerce 3-4 (Vanderbilt
Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-16, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-I 120503.
10. Id. at 4; see also Ricardo Mel~ndez-Ortiz, Trade and Equity in a World Where
Goods Carry Carbon Passports, in WHAT IF?, supra note 1, at 79; John H. Barton,
Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries:
An Analysis of Solar Photovotaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies 2 (Int'l Ctr. for Trade &
Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 2, 2007) (describing how the Kyoto Protocol created a
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), "leading to a supervised market in 'carbon
credits"').
11. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation:
The International
Organizationfor Standardizationand Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 487 (1995). The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) provided impetus for "eco-labelling." Id. at 481-91; accord Errol
Meidinger, Multi-InterestSelf-Governance Through Global Product CertificationPrograms,
in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS?
SELF-GOVERNANCE
IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC
TRANSACTIONS 259 (Dilling et al. eds., 2007). These eco-labels now include energy
efficiency, management of biodiversity, animal welfare, low carbon footprint, no use of
chemicals, wildlife protection, and more.
12. Mary E. Footer, The Role of "Soft" Law Norms in Reconciling the Antinomies of
WTO Law 2-3 (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 54/08, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l 159929
("The term 'soft law' in
international law and international relations is often used to characterise a variety of extralegal or non-legal norms, which are 'in the twilight between law and politics' and which,
while deliberately of a non-binding character, have legal relevance." (footnotes omitted));
see also id. at 12-14 (discussing relationship between ISO and TBT).
13. DOUGLAS MURRAY, LAURA T. RAYNOLDS & PETER LEIGH TAYLOR, ONE CUP AT A
TIME: POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND FAIR TRADE COFFEE IN LATIN AMERICA 27 (2003),
available
at
http://www.colostate.edu/depts/sociology/FairTradeResearchGroup/doc/
fairtrade.pdf ("Fair Trade seeks to challenge existing relations in the global economy by
example, using consumer/producer alliances: to create an alternative pricing system based
as much on social justice concerns as on economic factors; to eliminate unnecessary
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market according to principles other than reduction of tariffs, some argue
that they have the potential to create a sustainable and possibly more ethical
alternative to mainstream trade.14 They may have positive spillover effects
for all stakeholders in the form of increased environmental quality.
Consumers drive this decentralized global regulatory environment-by
their choices of what to buy, based on labels and marks. Because
sustainable trade foregrounds consumer ethics, 15 and because the figure of
the confused consumer is still the crux of U.S. unfair competition law, this
essay analyzes these newer regulatory practices primarily from consumer
perspectives. Within both mainstream and sustainable trade channels,
consumers require more accurate information in order for these sorts of
transactions to have integrity-whether this requirement is expressed as a
consumer's right to information, a right
to participate meaningfully in a
6
expression.'
of
right
a
as
or
realm,
civic

intermediaries who capture excessive portions of the price attached to commodities; and to
transform transnational corporate practices, at times in spite of corporate efforts to the
contrary, to address social and environmental concerns at both ends of the
production/consumption continuum. It is an alliance with the capacity to transform
participants throughout the Fair Trade continuum."). See generally FAIR TRADE: THE
CHALLENGES OF TRANSFORMING GLOBALIZATION (Laura T. Raynolds, Douglas L. Murray &

John Wilkinson eds., 2007) [hereinafter FAIR TRADE].
14. The International Trade Centre, which is a joint agency of the WTO and the United
Nations, views this trade paradigm as a viable alternative to the pure WTO model. Its slogan
is "Export Impact For Good." See generally International Trade Centre, Export Impact for
Good, http://www.intracen.org/welcome.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). Other agencies,
such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, support this view. See generally ALICE
BYERS, DANIELE GIOVANNUCCI & PASCAL Liu, VALUE-ADDING STANDARDS IN THE NORTH
AMERICAN FOOD MARKET: TRADE OPPORTUNITIES IN CERTIFIED PRODUCTS FOR DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES (2008), availableat ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/0 10/al 585e/a I585e.pdf.
15. GAVIN FRIDELL, FAIR TRADE COFFEE:

THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF MARKET-

DRIVEN SOCIAL JUSTICE 63 (2007) (quoting fair trade coalition FINE statement: "Fair Trade

is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks greater
equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering better
trading conditions to, and securing the rights of marginalisedproducers and workersespecially in the South. Fair Trade organisations (backed by consumers) are engaged
actively in supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigningfor changes in the
rules and practice of conventional internationaltrade." (emphasis added)). Gavin Fridell
calls this the "decommodification" perspective. Gavin Fridell, Fair Trade and
Neoliberalism: Assessing EmergingPerspectives,33 LATIN AM. PERSP. 8, 20-21 (2006)

16. TOM ROTHERHAM, TRADE KNOWLEDGE NETWORK LABELLING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PURPOSES: A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE DEBATE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
12-14 (2003) (expressing a right of information); Peter S. Menell, Structuring a MarketOriented FederalInformation Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435, 1445 (1995) (framing the issue
as one of informed consumer choice); Kysar, supra note 8, at 610-17 (positing a right to

expression and participation in civic live through consumer choices). This essay excludes
the perspectives of buyer firms and other stakeholders in the middle part of the value chain.
Others have examined how firms might discipline each other through private ordering to
ensure quality control throughout the chain. See generally Blair et al., supra note 9;
Meidinger, supra note 11, at 262 (describing pressures brought by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) upon Home Depot and Lowes to commit to buying certified wood
products); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 11, at 534-37 (proposing a system for better third-party
certification).
A certification carries producer-specific paperwork and very tangible
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The tangle of standards, certifications, labels, and marks is largely left
alone in the intellectual property literature. Of course, certifications do not
always lead to marks, whether trademarks or CMs. This is because a
standard may not be directed to an end-consumer in a retail context, but
rather to a middle firm in a value chain. Trademark law to date has focused
on what will be called here first-party certifiers, that is, the firm itself that
markets a particular brand of good or service, signaling source of origin
directly to consumers via trademarks. The classic trademark paradigm of
first-party certifiers assumes that a firm will act in its own self-interest and
maximize quality assurance of its product or services. In this conventional
narrative, the roles of second-party certifiers (voluntary industry
associations or buyer firms in a value chain) 17 or third-party certifiers
(independent third-party, nongovernmental standard-setting, inspection,
assurance, and certification services 1 8) in providing quality assurance to
consumers has also not been rigorously evaluated.
A good or service's labels and marks (and any underlying standards and
certifications) increasingly signify characteristics within global value
chains. Typically an entity (often a third party) will certify that a good or
service conforms to a standard (which can be set privately-through a firm
itself, a civil society organization, a trade association, or a combination of
some or all of the above). This certification then may be communicated to
a buyer through a marketing campaign such as a firm's corporate social
responsibility (CSR) literature, 19 implicitly through a trademark's assurance
of quality, or more explicitly through adherence to the standards required
by a CM. Marks can thus inform intermediate buyers (variously referred to
as buyer or purchaser firms, or second parties) or end-consumers of product
qualities related to the largely opaque steps of the process leading to the
product to which they are affixed. These process standards include not only
quality assurance standards, which are within the classic trademark
mandate, but also sustainability measures. As stated above, marks now
express-whether implicitly or explicitly--environmental, human rights,
and labor characteristics, as well as classic health and safety standards (e.g.,
Underwriters Laboratory). These marks place a proverbial stamp of ethical
approval upon standards developed largely outside of public view.
The traditional trademark law framework largely ignores these newer
process-related quality claims, just as process characteristics are generally
traceability and thus may be more important to intermediaries in the value chain than
certificationmarks, which are aimed at consumers.
17. Laura T. Raynolds & John Wilkinson, Fair Trade in the Agriculture and Food
Sector: Analytical Dimensions, in FAIR TRADE, supra note 13, at 33, 41.
18. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA REP. NO. TCT-512, GLOBAL
STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 2 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].

19. Sustainability has become a huge factor within marketing and advertising of goods.
Notes from WEDF Conference, Trade, What If? (Oct. 8-11, 2008) (on file with author)
[hereinafter WEDF Notes]. For example, Marks & Spencer's sustainability advertising
campaign is "There is no Plan B." Id. Price Waterhouse has a similar slogan: "Doing
nothing is not an option." Id.
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compartmentalized from product characteristics in other areas of law such
as international trade law. 20 The use of wholly proprietary standards by
firms (for example, the Starbucks Coffee and Farmer Equity (CAFE)
standards) raises the issue of whether a consumer might view them
plausibly as explicit characteristics of the quality guaranteed by a
trademark.
Moreover, while usually viewed as an inconsequential
backwater of trademark law, CMs are playing an ever-expanding role in the
explicit certification of goods, such as "organic" commodities that are
certified to meet certain standards, or services such as "LEED"
certifications of the U.S. Green Building Council. 21 Yet, curiously, the
function of CMs in the private standard-setting context has been almost as
underexamined as that of trademarks.
In this initial foray, my primary purpose is to identify the major lacunae
in this complex emerging global governance framework. One immediately
apparent issue is a systematic lack of accountability among certifying firms.
Several commentators have observed that virtually no overarching entity,
whether public or private, is monitoring certification quality. 22 Consumers
may be removed from this process altogether, or at the very least, several
steps from quality control. Another gap has to do with a lack of
transparency, evidenced by a newer kind of consumer confusion. This
confusion (or what might accurately be called ignorance) is created
simultaneously by lack of information as well as informational clutter about
standards. 23 Currently, consumer trust in certified goods and services can
only operate at the caveat emptor level, because so much of the standardsetting and certification process is beyond public oversight. At the same
time, standard-setting activities can result (and have indeed resulted) in
different, inconsistent regimes governing the same area.
Therefore, an updated public law framework for this growing trend
towards market-based regulation seems not only sensible but critically
20. See generally Kysar, supra note 8.
21. U.S. Green Bldg. Council LEED Certified USGBC, U.S. Trademark Serial No.
77199311 (filed June 6, 2007). CMs are also emerging from relative obscurity, partly
because they are the legal mechanism through which the United States implements
protection of geographical indications as obligated by the WTO Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS). Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, arts. 22-24, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; see infra Part I.
22. See OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 9-10; Blair et al., supra note 9, at 10; Daniele
Giovannucci & Stefano Ponte, Standards as a New Form of Social Contract? Sustainability
Initiatives in the Coffee Industry, 30 FOOD POL'Y 284, 289 (2005).
23. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 270-73 (describing confusion in competing standards
in organic agriculture, apparel, and fisheries sectors). For example, Wall Street firms
supposedly are being certified for compliance to standards in the single area in which there
are generally accepted standards-financial auditing. And yet, we have recently seen a
number of financial scandals related to lack of regulatory oversight, both public and private.
See Michael Lewis & David Einhom, Op-Ed., The End of the FinancialWorld as We Know
It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at 9 (recommending checks on misleading ratings created by
credit agencies Moody's and Standard & Poor's).
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overdue. While the Lanham Act cannot bear the sole burden of addressing
these gaps, it should be synchronized more carefully with this emerging
And although not all certifications are
private ordering regime.
administered through federally registered trademarks or CMs, common-law
rights can nonetheless inhere in certifications that are used like marks under
the Lanham Act. 24 Either explicitly or implicitly, standard setting and
certifications operate under the shadow of the law of unfair competition,
and should be viewed as an integral part of that long-standing body of
common law, as well as of the law of international trade.
I. PRIVATE REGULATION AND ITS DISCONNECTS

A. Multistakeholder Governance
Private standards-taxonomized in the next section-function as
25
normative technical components of a transnational regulatory system.
These standards are set, implemented, interpreted, monitored, and marketed
by regulatory entrepreneurs 26 engaging in what (in the context of
sustainable forestry certification) Errol Meidinger has termed
multistakeholder governance. 27 Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) are
often composed of private actors, such as industry, producer, or trade
associations and/or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) representing
24. Institut Nat'l Des Appellations d'Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1875, 1885 (T.T.A.B. 1998); see also 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 19:90 (4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter MCCARTHY] (citing Florida v. Real Juices,
Inc., 330 F. Supp. 428 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 11

(1995)).
25. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 268 ("Labeling requirements, rather than being mere
technical matters, are forums for policy debate and competition."); Margaret Jane Radin,
Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125
(2002) (noting that standards are simultaneously technical and legal); Jane Winn & Nicholas
Jondet, Better Regulation for Consumers: Integrating ICT Standards and Consumer
Protection (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l1303061 (evaluating the
possibility of embedding consumer protection within ICT standards). Standards are as old as
trade itself because merchants have needed to know precisely what is being bought and sold
through weights and measures. Philip Weiser claims that the first notable U.S. national
standard was for railroads during the Civil War, which "helped the North win the war (on
account of its superior supply chain management)." Philip J. Weiser, Making the World Safe
for Standard Setting 4 (Univ. of Colo. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-06, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid= 1003432#.
26. Steve Chamovitz, Accountability of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in
Global Governance 38 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 145, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-716381 ("Just as
private corporations are being subjected to claims of triple bottom line and corporate social
responsibility, similar transfigurational ideas are being applied to international organizations
and their treaties. In my view, it is the NGOs, acting as 'transnational norm entrepreneurs,'
who, along with the publicists, are leading the way in these developments.").
27. Errol Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in Emerging
TransnationalRegulatory Systems 2 (Univ. of Buffalo Law Sch., Buffalo Legal Studies,
Research Paper No. 2006-019, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cftn?abstract id+91 7952.
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particular perspectives or interests. Standard setting, certification, and
labelling have major implications with respect to global trade and trademark
law, supposedly driven by consumer choice. As Douglas Kysar states,
"consumer process preferences can be understood not from the standpoint
of their effect on the external world or their utility as mechanisms for public
expression, but rather simply from the premise that consumption 2often
is an
8
intensely personal activity with significant moral consequences."
Consumers are not the only stakeholders who must trust standards,
however. At the firm level, third-party standards allow the development of
trust between far-flung buyers and sellers, thus facilitating private ordering
beyond close-knit communities. 29 They also encourage the creation of
more horizontal, rather than vertical, lines of trade and enhance the ability
30
of firms to engage with complementary assets provided by other firms.
However, because these standards are increasingly privatized, they can be
developed and enforced largely outside of public oversight. The questions
of due process within the standard-setting process, potential abuse of
market position, and related issues have long been a concern with respect to
the decentralized promulgation of standards. 3 1 Furthermore, once the
standards are in place, Margaret Jane Radin observes, "What's good about
standards?
Often mentioned are network effects and fostering
interoperability[,] . . . but standardization is often thought to be harmful,
too. In particular, standardization is associated with the possibility of lock32
in, the possibility of lock-out, and the possibility of coercion."
From a producer (e.g., farmer or exporter) perspective, standards can
pose barriers to market entry (lock-out) because they may be hard to locate
and therefore difficult to comply with (i.e., certify). This is especially true
for competitors hailing from information- or resource-poor regions. 3 3 Even
SSOs with relatively open standards and policies may still charge a fee for
access to their written standards, certification processes, and/or marks; a
revenue-generating model of standards licensing is common. 34 Because of
this, competitors may perceive unequal access to information about
standards, even where a standard is theoretically open, especially to the
28. Kysar, supra note 8, at 617; see also Steve Chamovitz, InternationalStandardsand
the WTO 13-14 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working
Paper
No.
133,
2005),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?
abstractid=694346.
29. Blair et al., supra note 9, at 16.
30. David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration,Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285 (1986) (arguing

that "complementary assets" such as distribution and service mechanisms are necessary for
innovators to benefit from newly developed product protected by law).
31. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 18.

32. Radin, supra note 25, at 1130-32.
33. Giovannucci, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that most producers encounter five barriers
in dealing with standards: difficulty selecting a standard; facilitating adopting standards;
generating and acquiring capital; transaction costs; and managing risks).
34. For example, the international standard-setting organization, ISO, charges for
standards published in documents available through its website.
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extent that it has become an industry norm or a de facto requirement for
35
doing business.
Reverting to a consumer perspective, standards and certifications
represented by marks purportedly privilege consumer choice, based on what
these marks represent in the marketplace. But private standards are
simultaneously a decentralized form of market regulation and a vehicle of
market manipulation-the latter to the extent that the mark is opaque and
the consumer may not know what he or she is getting. By implication,
consumer trust can be breached through indifference to conformity with
standards or even by outright deceit.
The transaction costs associated with these consumer choices come in
two major forms, both informational. The first form is of subtle market
positioning, where a firm may play upon consumer perceptions of social
responsibility and other amorphous measures represented by a mark. Here,
the potential for abuse is large, and even consumers seem to be aware of
this. Consumer surveys indicate that the public is skeptical of ethical
claims by companies, retailers, and even governments. 36 Consumers are
not often in a position to be able to assess the truthfulness of a claim made
about a product's qualities; thus, the issue of consumer trust is central to the
legitimate functioning of this regulatory regime. The second type of
transaction cost could be viewed as the failure of success. Certain
sustainability standards have proliferated
to the point that consumers are
37
unable to differentiate among them.
Both of these consumer-related costs are different from the typical costs
associated with standards, such as lock-in or lock-out. The danger of the
capture of standards does not occur in the same manner in the trademark
area as it does in patent or copyright law. In the latter realms, the potential
refusal of intellectual property owners to license standards that have been
38
widely adopted in the market can create anticompetitive effects.
However, the anticompetitive effects of standards through trademarks may
not be through outright refusals to license; indeed, CM holders are bound to
35. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 11, at 500 ("The quality control standard also portended
the possibilities and dangers ahead. The ISO 9000 series quickly became a de facto
requirement for doing business in Europe and other parts of the world. Companies required
proof through an independent, registered 'certifier' that their suppliers and subcontractors
complied with the standard."). The standards associated with good agricultural practices of

the Global Partnership for Safe and Sustainable Agriculture (Global-GAP) have become a de
facto requirement for agrifood trade with most European Union (EU) countries. WEDF
Notes, supra note 19.
36. Harriet Lamb, Fairtrade: Working to Make Markets Fair,in WHAT IF?, supra note

1, at 59; Mel~ndez-Ortiz, supra note 10, at 79, 84.
37. This issue of proliferation has also affected agricultural producers, who find it hard
to "keep up with and even to understand the standards. [One researcher] finds that many
standards and codes of practice have been driven by Northern consumer and NGO
perceptions of business responsibility and have been more ad hoc rather than comprehensive
and consultative." Giovannucci, supra note 1, at 106.
38. Lemley, supra note 5, at 1901-03. This is especially true in industries such as
information and communications technology (ICT) where compatibility and interoperability
are keys to market participation. Miller, supra note 5, at 351-54.
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license their marks through a statutory rule of nondiscrimination. 39 Rather,
multiple stakeholders operate within this decentralized framework to shape
a regulatory environment that is based on trust. A mark may represent
much more than a product's surface qualities. If the point is to nudge the
purchases,
market toward more ethical choices through consumer-driven
40
marks can represent a critical point of potential accountability.
B. Standards
What is a standard? In a broad sense, it can be described simply as a
"norm for market-based activity." 4 1 Indeed, Radin supports this expansive
42
definition by including language (such as English) as a kind of standard.
Other more commonly understoOd standards include measurements such as
the inch, technical specifications such as a computer operating system, or
form contracts such as Creative Commons licenses. Mark Lemley defines a
standard "as any set of technical specifications that either provides or is
intended to provide a common design for a product or process." 43 As these
definitions imply, standards can be set by any entity. Indeed, SSOs can be
intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the contracting states of the WTO,
which set the minimum standards for the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)), 44 a government, or a
combination of these and other regulatory entrepreneurs, including but not

39. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(D) (2006); MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 19:92 ("This
obligation distinguishes a certification mark from a trademark and creates a kind of
'compulsory licensing."').
40. Giovannucci & Ponte, supra note 22, at 286 ("In the last decade or so, ever more
awareness of the socio-economic plight of developing country farmers, increased interest in
the health and safety of food, and scientific recognition that expansion of the agricultural
frontier constitutes the greatest threat to global biodiversity have further popularized several
agricultural sustainability initiatives. As a result, sustainability (or cause-related) standards
have enjoyed a much greater recognition and a fast-growing market value."). Fair trade is
concerned with developing markets and relationships between the global North and South
through standards and certification. More recent efforts involve South-South trade or direct
marketing by Southern producers without intermediaries such as certifiers. Murray et al.,
supra note 13, at 24-31; see also CATHY FARNWORTH & MICHAEL GOODMAN, GROWING
ETHICAL NETWORKS:

THE FAIR TRADE MARKET FOR RAW AND PROCESSED AGRICULTURAL

PRODUCTS 10-11 (2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR
2008/Resources/2795087-1191427986785/FamworthC&GoodmanMGrowingEthicalNet
works%5B 1%5D.pdf.
41. Charnovitz, supra note 28, at 2 ("The broad definition pursued here should be
contrasted with the narrower definition of 'standard' used in the WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In TBT, a standard is defined as a: Document approved
by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or
characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which
compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology,
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or
production method." (emphasis added) (citing TBT Agreement, supra note 7, Annex 1, para.
2)); id. at 4.
42. Radin, supra note 25, at 1126-27.
43. Lemley, supra note 5, at 1896.
44. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21.
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limited to civil society organizations such45as NGOs, trade groups, or even
individuals such as activist law professors.
Analyses of standard-setting processes differentiate among product
standards, 4 6 control standards, 47 and process standards. 4 8 Other enduring
axes are voluntary as opposed to mandatory standards,4 9 and open versus
proprietary standards; each of these axes may be more of a continuum than
a dichotomy. 50 Yet another distinction is between de jure versus de facto
standards, although this may be another false dichotomy because of the
increasingly hybrid nature of some standards. Meidinger observes that
"governments interact with [standards and] certification programs in a
bewildering and sometimes contradictory variety of ways." 51 Examples of
standards shaped through classic public regulation include U.S. Department
of Agriculture (product) classifications or the Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP)/Intellectual Property (IP) (process) standards for Internet
52
interoperability promulgated by the U.S. Department of Defense.
In the United States, standard setting typically is more decentralized and
privatized than in many other parts of the world. 53 Although the U.S.
government tends to be hands-off, it takes the following official position on
private SSOs:
(1) "Voluntary consensus standards bodies" are domestic or international
organizations which plan, develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary
consensus standards using agreed-upon procedures.... A voluntary
consensus standards body is defined by the following attributes:
(i) Openness.
(ii) Balance of interest.
(iii) Due process.

45. Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, PrivatizingEmployment Protections,49 ARIZ.
L. REV. 587 (2007) (proposing a certification mark that allows employees and applicants to
enforce the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation).
46. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 99 ("[Product] standards [are those that] embody
information. By specifying the characteristics of a product, they allow for product
identification, interoperability, and quality control.").
47. Id. at 100 ("Control standards are designed to address a societal hazard or problem.
They generally define a range of acceptability with respect to the design, performance,
and/or use of a product. Often taking the form of regulations, they range from such things as
building codes to fuel economy standards.").
48. Id. ("[P]rocess standards facilitate and support socioeconomic transactions and
interactions. They define roles and relationships, establish the rules for interpreting
behavior, and specify the way in which a particular procedure or process is executed."). A
PPM standard represents the process or method by which a product is produced. Charnovitz,
supra note 28, at 6.
49. TBT Agreement, supra note 7.
50. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1962-63.
51. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 273; see also id. at 273-76 (describing state actions
ranging from procurement to incorporation of standards into public regulations).
52. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 6,28,42.
53. See id. at 14.
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(iv) An appeals process.
54
(v) Consensus ....

In this context, the
pull for following the standard is not legal compulsion, but rather
enlightened self-interest. Of course, once adherence to a certain standard
becomes expected in the marketplace, a producer may feel economically
motivated to follow it (e.g., international accounting standards). Often
standards are accompanied by labels, marks, or
seals that rely on
55
information as a means of reinforcing the standard.
Nonetheless, as described above, well-developed norms governing the
relationship of standards and certifications to labels and marks are lacking,
at least within the context of the Lanham Act. The pieces (national and
international, especially) are not often viewed as part of the same regulatory
puzzle.
Part of the impetus for the growth of standards is the expansion of
international markets, which rely on longer supply chains and
outsourcing, 56 along with a greater complexity of products and division of
labor. 57 One observer claims that the typical commodity transaction
involves no fewer than eighteen links. 58 Driving factors are also the
international institutions that facilitate trade and development. Among
these is ISO, which is a "world-wide federation of national standards bodies
from over 100 countries." 59 Neither fish nor fowl, ISO is not an
intergovernmental trade organization such as the WTO, nor is it part of the
United Nations (U.N.) system. Rather, it is an outsized NGO that functions
as an (some might say the) international standards development institution
where "[s]tandards are developed by a consensus process in order to be
inclusive of the views of all stakeholders. They represent industry-wide
interests, seek to promote global solutions and are voluntary." 60 Yet despite
ISO's growing influence "there are only limited opportunities for public
'6 1
involvement."
The so-called "ISO 9000" standards of quality management, promulgated
in 1987, were a huge leap forward with respect to third-party certification
and standard setting. An early observer noted,

54. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-119 (1998), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a119/al 19.html.
55. Charnovitz, supra note 28, at 3.
56. See OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 11.
57. See id. at 11-12.
58. JACQUELINE DECARLO, FAIR TRADE: A BEGINNER'S GUIDE 14 (2007) (citing
MICHAEL BARRATT BROWN, FAIR TRADE: REFORM AND REALITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL

TRADING SYSTEM (1993)).
59. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK

&

ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL

TRADE 151 (2d ed. 1999); accordChamovitz, supra note 28, at 25-26.
60. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 59, at 151.
61. Chamovitz, supra note 28, at 25-26.
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ISO 9000 represented a departure from conventional ISO work products
in two ways. First, ISO 9000 was the first international standard that did
not simply harmonize existing, uniform national standards. Second, the
standards were applicable to a wide range of industries and services,
rather than to a specific product, process, or plant.
The ISO 9000 quality control standards, published in 1987, contain
guidelines for companies to use both in their own implementation of a
quality assurance system and in specifying contract requirements for
quality
suppliers and subcontractors. The explicit goal was to harmonize
62
assurancerequirements to facilitate internationaltrade.
These ISO 9000 standards resulted in "certification [becoming] rapidly a de
facto requirement for doing business in Europe and other parts of the
world. '' 63 Some examples of other international SSOs besides the ISO
include the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized
UN agency, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), a non-UN intergovernmental organization, and the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (Codex), an intergovernmental body established
Organization (FAO) and the World
jointly by the Food and Agriculture
64
Health Organization (WHO).
Another important driving factor behind standard setting is international
trade law-in particular, the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to
TBT distinguishes between "technical regulation[s]" and
Trade. 65 The
"standard[s]. ' '66 Compliance with the former is mandatory; with the latter,
compliance is optional. 67 (This essay refers to both categories-voluntary
and mandatory-as "standards.") In relation to certification and labeling,
the TBT defines both technical regulations and standards to "include or deal
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling
68
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.
The TBT provides that, where international standards exist, national
governments should use these standards as the basis for their own technical

62. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 11, at 499 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
63. Id. at 500 (emphasis omitted).
64. Chamovitz, supra note 28, at 23-29.
65. See id. at 10.
66. TBT Agreement, supra note 7, Annex 1.
67. Id.
68. Id. Annex 1.1, paras. 1-2 (defining the term "[t]echnical regulation" as a
"[d]ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which
compliance is mandatory" (emphasis added)). The narrower definition of "[sitandard" is a
[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and
repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.
Id. Annex 1.2, para. 1(emphasis added).
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requirements. 69 Furthermore, under the TBT regime, compliance with an
international standard provides a procedural presumption in a complaint
filed with the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that a
70
particular process is not a trade barrier.
Steve Charnovitz notes that the TBT Code of Good Practice for the
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards (TBT Code), which is
Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, has certain provisions related to
transparency of substantive standards, process, and results:
For example, the Code states that standardizing bodies shall make every
effort to achieve a "national consensus" on the standards they develop
(para. H). The TBT Code also contains cutting-edge participation
provisions. Specifically, it provides that before adopting a standard, the
body shall allow a period of at least 60 days for comments on a draft
standard by interested parties in any WTO Member country (para. L).
The body is further directed to take these comments into account and, if
requested, to reply as promptly as possible (para. N). Another rule is that
standardizing bodies shall provide adequate
opportunities for consultation
71
with other standardizing bodies (para. Q).
While the TBT Code by its text "is open to acceptance" by
nongovernmental bodies, 72 it is only binding on central government
standardizing bodies. 73 Thus,
[a]lthough the procedural guidelines in the Standards Code are generally
considered robust, there is a fundamental flaw in their implementation:
the WTO cannot impose requirements on private bodies, only on
governments. As a result, the Standards Code only has legal weight if
member governments have effective
control over national standards
74
bodies. This is not always the case.
Nonetheless, some major SSOs such as the International Social and
Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance, have
adopted all or some of its provisions. 75 Furthermore,
69. Id.

art. 2.4;

see also TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 59, at 143; Charnovitz, supra

note 28, at 15.
70. TBT Agreement, supra note 7, art. 2.5 ("Whenever a technical regulation is
prepared, adopted or applied for one of the legitimate objectives explicitly mentioned in
paragraph 2, and is in accordance with relevant international standards, it shall be rebuttably
presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.").
71. Charnovitz, supra note 28, at 10.
72. TBT Agreement, supra note 7, Annex 3B.
73. Id. art. 4.
74. ROTHERHAM, SUpra note 16, at 15.
75. ISEAL ALLIANCE, ISEAL CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE FOR SETTING SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS
4
(public
version
4
2006),
available at

http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/userupload/content/P005 ISEALCode-PD4_Jan_06.pd
f. ("The ISEAL Alliance defines and codifies best practice, at the international level, for the

design and implementation of social and environmental standards systems. ISEAL Alliance
members are committed to meeting this best practice in order to ensure their systems are

credible and accessible. The ISEAL Alliance provides a global framework for the social and
environmental standards movement to coordinate, cooperate and build its capacity to deliver
positive global impacts.").
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[s]everal governments advocated the adoption of a TBT Committee
Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards,
and this has now been done. Attaining such disciplines was also endorsed
by ISO and the [International Electrotechnical Commission].
are meant to guide international
The TBT Committee Principles
76
standard-setting organizations.

Despite these nonbinding principles and voluntary initiatives, the process
by which the private standards themselves come into being is largely
shielded from public view. The "fair trade" standards are an example of a
stated grassroots collaborative approach toward relatively open standards,
explicitly involving producers (farmer associations) as well as the thirdparty certifier Fairtrade Labelling Organizations (FLO International), the
nonprofit international fair trade certification consortium. 77 By contrast,
purely proprietary standard setting by a firm, such as the CAFE standards
or
set by Starbucks, may not necessarily involve regulatory entrepreneurs
78
stakeholders other than the firm itself and also may be less transparent.
C. Certifications

Third-party certifications to standards are key components of this private
form of regulation. As Meidinger explains,
A central actor in implementing multi-interest self-governance is the
certifier, who is conceived as a trustworthy expert who can verify for
outsiders that a firm is performing to standard. The certifier is directly
76. Charnovitz, supra note 28, at 21 (citing Communication from Brazil, G/TBT/W/140
(July 28, 2000)). Steve Chamovitz further observes,
Transparency, Openness, Impartiality and
The listed principles include:
Consensus, Effectiveness and Relevance, Coherence, and a Development
Dimension. As of now, the principles are non-binding, but there have been
suggestions that adherence to these principles be made a condition for recognizing
a particular set of international standards in the WTO. The standardizing
institutions have not questioned the audacity of the TBT Committee in
propounding these principles, but there would certainly be grounds for doing so.
The problem is not the substance of the principles; most of them reflect
conventional wisdom on good governance. The problem is that the WTO itself
does not honor these principles in its own activities.
Id. (citing Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International
Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the
Agreement, G/TBT/9, Annex 4 (Nov. 13, 2000)).
77. Fairtrade Labelling Organization, http://www.fairtrade.net/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2009). Fairtrade Labelling Organization International (FLO) is an umbrella organization that
unites 20 labelling initiatives in 21 countries and 3 producer networks in Latin America,
Africa, and Asia. Other stakeholders in setting fair trade certification standards for
commodities could include trade associations (including various intermediaries such as
coffee roasters in the case of coffee, exporters, distributors, as well as the retailers) and
consumers, as well as public regulatory agencies (e.g., the FDA on the domestic level or the
FAO on the international level).
78. STARBUCKS CORP., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, FISCAL 2007 ANNUAL
OUR COMMITMENT TO ETHICAL COFFEE SOURCING
REPORT:
STARBUCKS CSR REPORT].

11 (2007)

[hereinafter
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analogous to a government inspector or hearing officer in a traditional
regulatory scheme,79 except that the firm, rather than the state, chooses and
pays the certifier.

Firms providing ISO 9000 quality assurance certification grew rapidly from
roughly 28,000 in 1993 to 670,400 in 2004.80 After the advent of
environmental certification in 1996 (the ISO 14,000 environmental
management standards), the number of firms and facilities meeting those
standards rose to 90,569 in 2004.81
Certification is also fueled by a growing demand for products that
embody workplace safety, labor, and environmental minimum standards by,
for example, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds. 82 This demand
for socially responsible trade also correlates with the decided rise in NGO
activity during the 1990s.83 Some of these NGOs catalyze the standardsetting process; others are involved as third-party certifiers; some are mark
holders; some do all three. The American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), the U.S. representative to ISO, has noted the growing trend toward

social performance certification. 8485ISO is currently developing ISO 26,000

standards for social responsibility.
A number of social-responsibility-oriented certifying firms came into
existence in the 1990s. One major firm specializing in third-party social
accountability certification is Social Accountability International (SAI),
which is a U.S.-based, nonprofit organization that promulgates "an
auditable certification standard [SA8000] based on international and
workplace norms." 86 Socially responsible trade is evident as well in
79. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 267.
80. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
81. Blair et al., supra note 9, at 7.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id.; see also James McGann and Mary Johnstone, The Power Shift and the NGO
Credibility Crisis, INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Jan. 2006, at 65, 67 ("The Economist
estimates that the number of international non-governmental organizations rose from 6,000
in 1990 to 26,000 in 1996. According to the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report,
nearly one-fifth of the world's thirty-seven thousand INGOs (international nongovernmental organizations) were formed in the 1990s.").
84. See generally Blair et al., supra note 9, at 6 (also noting trend toward social
performance certification); American National Standards Institute, http://www.ansi.org/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009).
85. International Organization for Standardization, ISO Social Responsibility,
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/830949/3934883/3935096/home.html?n
odeid=4451259&vernum=0 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
86. Social Accountability International, Overview of SA8000, www.sa-intl.org/index.
cfin?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageld=473 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). According to its
website, Social Accountability International (SAI) "works with companies, consumer
groups, non-govemmental organizations (NGOs), workers and trade unions, local
governments-as well as a network of agencies accredited for SA8000 auditing, to help
ensure that workers of the world are treated according to basic human rights principles."
Social Accountability International, http://www.sa-intl.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); see
also Fortin, supra note 3, at 51 ("[T]here is no single set of internationally recognized
standards for ethical trade .... some of its components-notably labour standards-have
been elaborated by non-governmental international organizations ... [such as] the Social
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voluntary CSR standards adopted by second-party certifiers such as
industry associations. 87 For example, the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme is a system administered through the diamond industry, and
functions both to certify diamonds in accordance with a U.N. resolution to
address the problem of conflict diamonds 88 and to meet demand for
conflict-free diamonds by wealthy, socially aware consumers.8 9 Transfair
USA is a U.S.-based nonprofit responsible for certifying commodities as
complying with fair trade standards developed by FLO International. 90
FLO International is a nonprofit, multistakeholder association established in
1997 and based in Germany. It bills itself as the leading standard setting
and certification organization for labeled Fairtrade. 9 1 Because it separates
the certification process from the standard-setting process, it complies with
the ISO standards. 92 It is the subject of a more detailed case study in a
subsequent section of this essay.
Whether within or without the ISO framework, certification itself is
ironically not an area that is highly supervised. The financial services
industry has developed generally accepted financial auditing practices and
professional standards that constrain the overall lack of oversight over
certification firms. 93
However, only one international professional
organization offers services to audit and monitor third-party certifiers
generally. 94 In the social responsibility field, a move toward developing
best practices for standard setting and certification is underway, and the
same is true in the area of environmental certification. 9 5 ANSI has
developed what are called "conformity assessment measures" for firms to
comply with standards in accordance with ISO and TBT guidelines; the
ISO/IEC guide defines "conformity assessment" as "any activity concerned
Accountability 8000 (or SA8000) Standards and the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) Base
Code and Principles of Implementation."); Blair et al., supra note 9, at 9.
87. OTA REPORT, supranote 18, at 20.
88. See G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Jan. 29, 2001).
89. Footer, supra note 12, at 17-18 (discussing the 2003 WTO waiver covering conflict
diamonds).
90. Fair
Trade
Labelling
Organizations
International,
http://www.transfairusa.org/content/about/aboutus.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).

91. Fairtrade Labelling Organizations, supra note 77.
92. Stephanie Barrentios & Sally Smith, Mainstreaming Fair Trade in Global
Production Networks, in FAIR TRADE, supra note 13, at 118-19; Laura T. Raynolds &
Michael A. Long, Fair/Alternative Trade: Historical and Empirical Dimensions, FAIR
TRADE, supra note 13, at 15, 19 (referencing INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/IEC
GUIDE 65: 1996 (1996)).

93. Blair et al., supra note 9, at 10.
94. Id. at 5 ("Moreover, there appears to be only one significant professional
organization that offers any standardization and assurance of the assurance professionals
themselves. This is the International Register of Certificated Auditors (IRCA), a UK
organization based in London that was founded in 1984 as part of a UK government
initiative to establish and certify quality management standards.").
95. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 269; Elizabeth Guttenstein, ISEAL Alliance, Private
Standards and their Implications for Market Access, Development, WTO/Trade Rule,
Presentation at the UNCTAD-SPS Committee Information Session (June 2007), availableat
http://r0.unctad.org/trade-env/testl/meetings/wto l/ISEAL%20Guttenstein%20revised.pdf.
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with determining directly or indirectly that relevant requirements are
Conformity assessment includes sampling and testing,
fulfilled."'96
inspection, supplier's declaration of conformity, certification, and
It also includes
management system assessment and registration.
accreditation of the competence of those activities by a third party and
recognition (usually by a government agency) of an accreditation program's
capability.
In the forestry certification area, public standard-setting agencies have
converged with the private third-party certifiers. 9 7 However, it is unclear
whether this observation can be extrapolated to standard setting in all the
areas now covered by third-party certification, particularly in countries like
the United States that have a tradition of private sector standard setting, or
developing countries lacking full institutional capacity for standard-setting
activities. The fair trade social movement has explicitly participatory goals,
but other spheres not proclaiming such inclusionary values may have a less
transparent approach to developing, publicizing, and enforcing private
standards and their accompanying certification processes.
Within a third-party certification framework generally, the potential for
abuse of consumer trust exists because supplier firms requiring certification
to do business with purchaser firms may pick the third-party certifierresulting in an obviously less than fully disinterested certifier. 98 This
problem is quite apparent in the financial services industry where credit
rating agencies such as Moody's have contributed to the misleading nature

96. AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., NATIONAL CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES FOR
THE UNITED STATES 5 (2002), available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/
News%20and%2OPublications/Brochures/NCAP%20second%20edition.pdf; see also id. at 8
n.5 ("Where relevant, any certification mark, number or other identification that will be
required on the product's label or on the product's manual/accompanying
documentation/packaging/carton should be provided to the applicant at the time of
application rather than after completion of the assessment. Approval for its use on the
product will of course be dependent on the applicant's successful fulfillment of all
If the certification mark, number or other
conformity assessment requirements.
identification is only provided after completion of the assessment, the applicant cannot begin
to prepare for product distribution. This will delay time-to-market for the product. If, on the
other hand, the mark, number or other identification is provided up-front, the applicant can
proceed with preparation for distribution if the applicant is willing to assume the risks
associated with cancellation of packaging in the event that the product fails the
assessment.").
97. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 260-61.
98. Id. at 267 (noting that certification programs do not seem to have focused very
carefully on this risk thus far, but rather have dealt with it by primarily relying on
professionalism in accreditation standards and, in some cases, random external auditing);
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 11, at 534 (pointing to evidence of massive industry violations of a
voluntary code of conduct with respect to the use of pesticides); Blair et al., supra note 9, at
5 ("[The assurance business] is a business that is rife with the potential for abuse."); see also
Michael Moss & Andrew Martin, Food Problems Elude Private Inspectors, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2009, at Al (noting that the Peanut Corporation of America paid for private audits
of its facilities).
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of financial viability on Wall Street. 99 There may be other issues related to
misreporting of information by producers to the third-party certifier.' 00
And the third-party certifiers themselves may be under-resourced, be
untrained or unable to check for certain standards, and/or engage in less

than due diligence; for example, after the recent salmonella outbreak traced
to the Peanut Corporation of America, the director of the national organic
program issued a directive emphasizing that inspections should include
potential health violations and "while [they] do not expect organic
inspectors to be able to detect salmonella or pathogens ... their potential
sources should be obvious from evidence as bird, rodent and other animal
feces or other pest inspections."'' 1 These all raise the question: who is
watching the watchdogs? 10 2 Measures are needed to encourage verification

of certification results, 10 3 in order to increase the checks and balances
within this system.
D. Marks
The growth of standards and certifications raises the question of what
''quality assurance" is represented by their accompanying labels and marks,
if any. How are these labelling initiatives understood by the various market
actors? Drawing upon Graeme Dinwoodie's and Mark Janis's insight that
the social construction of trademark meaning is an active process between
mark holders and consumers, 10 4 I posit that the current meaning-making
environment for trademarks and CMs is highly dynamic. It involves overt
interplay among the usual suspects: courts, agencies such as the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO), competitors in the realms of products and
standards, and mark holders and consumers.
But, the discourse also
99. Lewis & Einhom, supra note 23 (describing how short-term interests of credit rating
agencies led to dubious ratings, and recommending reforms so that issuers do not pay for
ratings).
100. Giovannucci & Ponte, supra note 22, at 291-92 (listing issues ranging from
inspections that may take place only once to the employment of untrained college students to
verify standards).
101. Kim Severson & Andrew Martin, It's Organic, but Does That Mean It's Safer?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at DI; see also Blair et al., supra note 9, at 9.
102. See, e.g., Carbon Emissions Offset, http://www.ecobusinesslinks.com/carbonoffsetwind credits carbonreduction.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). My research
assistant's Internet research into the carbon credits listed in this handy table ended up in cold
trails with respect to how they are certified to comply with standards. This is not to cast
aspersions on the certifications made by the firms; rather, the point is that consumers have no
way of verifying the information.
103. Mel~ndez-Ortiz, supra note 10, at 84 ("New Zealand lamb exporters cannot be the
authority with the final say on whether their own meat is more energy-efficient than British
lamb, even with shipping included.").
104. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in
TrademarkLaw, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1604 (2007) ("Trademark law has become a leading
instrument for shaping the forces by which consumer understanding is developed. A
proactive view of trademark lawmaking embraces the proposition that trademark law should
be used to influence the norms that govern consumers' shopping habits. In contrast, a
reactive view relegates trademark law to the role of discerning and protecting extant
consumer understanding.").
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expands beyond this predictable epistemic community to include multiple
other stakeholders: SSOs like ISEAL; third-party certifiers (which may or
may not be the same as the mark holders); other actors in the value chain;
competing standard-setting bodies and their constituents, such as industry
associations, consumer organizations, other NGOs, and other
intergovernmental agencies; 10 5 as well as other government agencies. The
norm-setting and interpretation arena is vastly enlarged by these multiple
stakeholders and, more significantly, the meanings generated in this arena
are often hidden to the consuming public. Current trademark law funnels
all these perspectives through the proxy of the consumer confused with
respect to the claims of competing firms. However, the consumer
confusion generated by standards is of a very different sort than that
generated by passing off.
1. Quality
The conventional narrative of trademark law is that the firm's trademark
functions to indicate the source of manufacturing origin of a product, so as
to provide cognitive shortcuts to a consumer who will then repurchase the
same product if satisfied with the product's quality. 10 6 The underlying
rationale of trademark protection is based upon a decentralized and
privatized consumer protection scheme, where enforcement is provided by
competitors, who act as proxies for the consumers. Liability attaches to
"passing off'-that is, a competitor's labelling that "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,"' 1 7 so as to mix up the
quality-assurance signal performed by the mark. But as the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) has noted,
[t]he concept of "quality" of a product has become more complex over the
last decade, incorporating aspects of product differentiation, health,
safety, social and environmental implications of both products and
processes, trends that would otherwise seem to require more managerial
involvement and thus movement of production into vertically-integrated
firms. Yet ISO and other reliable standards have been developed that
permit standardization of these otherwise complex phenomena, including
the management systems to address them, permitting clear
communication to industrial buyers and consumers through
third-party
08
assurance and certification to credible quality standards.1

105. The International Trade Centre (ITC) and the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) have been active in promoting ethical trade via standards. WEDF
Notes, supra note 19.
106. See generally Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1789 (2007).
107. 15 U.S.C. § I I14(l)(a) (2006).
108. Blair et al., supra note 9, at 16 (emphasis added) (citing Peter Gibbon & Stefano
Ponte, Quality Standards, Conventions and the Governance of Global Value Chains, 34
ECON. & Soc'Y 1, 5 (2005)).
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The assumptions underlying the "credible quality standards" upon which
this system rests are dubious. They do not account for, or even anticipate,
the possible miscommunication resulting from a global marketplace
characterized by longer value chains, greater outsourcing, growing
complexity of products, and increased division of labor.
First, the traditional trademark guarantee of quality is not typically
mediated by third parties-rather, the consumer directly experiences the
quality of the good or service bearing a mark. By contrast, as described in
previous sections, standards and certifications inevitably make what is
being signaled by the mark quite intricate and opaque. And, the consumer
is located a fair distance in the value chain from an entity (certifier) that
creates a potentially false signal. The quality guaranteed by a certifying
firm may or may not be reflected in a mark per se; many sustainability
10 9
standards are used in addition to a mark as part of a marketing strategy.
For a product and process method (PPM) standard, the quality of a process
is typically not something that the consumer can verify directly. The
consumer simply must trust the certifier. A consumer is not going to be
able to tell whether a firm claiming that its products are not tested on
animals has in fact tested its mascara on bunnies.
Compared to trademarks, the purpose of certification marks is to
guarantee characteristics of the goods or services, rather than to brand the
goods and services themselves. 11 0 Indeed the conventional wisdom is that
CMs are the appropriate vehicle within the Lanham Act to represent
standards and certifications. For example, the USPTO has advocated the
use of CMs as geographical indications, which are often based upon
standards developed by regional producer associations. Upon closer
examination, however, CMs have numerous drawbacks, preventing them
from being a consistent basis for oversight of this complex area.

109. See,
e.g.,
The
Body
Shop,
Against
Animal
Testing,
http://www.thebodyshop.com/ en/ ww/values-campaigns/against-animal-testing.aspx? (last
visited Feb. 13, 2009) (owning a registered mark in its business name and having a wellhoned reputation for sustainable business practices); see also Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream, 2007
Social & Environmental Assessment, Milk & Cream, http://www.benjerry.com
/company/sear/2007/sear07_4.1 .cfm?mid-nenu4 (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
110. Both collective marks and certification marks were added to the federal trademark
statute in 1938 in order to comply with obligations under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property Article 7bis, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], as revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, at
Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2,
1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and as amended on
September 28, 1979). See Hearingon S. 2679 Before the J. Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong.
153-54 (1925) (statement of Bernard A. Kosicki, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, Department of Commerce), reprinted in 3 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND
PRACTICE: SECTION BY SECTION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LANHAM ACT § 4, at 4-5
(Jerome Gilson ed., 1988) [hereinafter TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE] ("That
would also, I believe, meet with our international obligations, in article 7 1/2 [sic] of the
Paris convention of 1883, which provides for the registration of association trade-marks. So
far we have not given effect to that measure because no machinery was available.").
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It is not clear whether firms have incentives to invest in or market CMs,
unless standards are already widespread or a firm wants to encourage the
adoption of new standards. On the one hand, CMs can generate revenue for
a CM holder (especially where standards are de facto requirements for
legitimate business). And they can convey rectitude to the consuming
public. On the other hand, the CM holder is obligated to license the mark to
all firms that meet the standard and may not market its own products
bearing a CM."' Until a standard is dominant in a market or unless the
mark holder is committed to something other than profit, there may be little
motivation to nurture a CM to maturity. When the mark holder is a
nonprofit or NGO, marketing may not
be as high a priority as developing
12
standards or working with producers.1
Even if a firm does invest in and register a CM, the same issue arises as
discussed above in the context of a trademark. The relevant consumer
confusion may be due more to the opacity of the characteristics guaranteed
by the CM than to the inability to distinguish between a real and a fake
mark. For these and other reasons, conflicts may exist between objectives
of a certification program and that of marketing or licensing a trademark
113
affiliated with the CM.
The flip side of opacity is too much information. Consumers may face a
confusing proliferation of certifications, labels, and marks. 114 While
competition among standards can lead to innovation and increased quality
of goods, it can also lead to the transactional costs associated with
informational clutter in the market. Plainly stated, consumers are faced
with an absence of transparency when differences among multiple
competing standards are not readily ascertainable. The plethora of certified
organic standards 115 has led to a recent successful effort on the part of U.N.
111. 15U.S.C.§ 1064.

112. Transfair 2005 marketing figures from 2005 Federal Tax Statements, 41-1848081
(showing $55,628 in advertising and $54,498 in promotional and PR expense) for Form 990,
Part II, Line 43.
113. The Ethiopian Coffee Network, for example decided to use a trademark licensing

strategy rather than a CM approach to promoting Ethiopian coffees in Northern markets. See
Ethiopian
Coffee Network,
About the Trademark and Licensing Initiative,
http://www.ethiopiancoffeenetwork.com/about6.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) ("Ethiopia

did consider another avenue, Certification Marks. CMs indicate and assure the coffee buyer
of the origin of a specific sack of coffee beans. Yet this legal tool, while valuable, would not
confer to Ethiopia legally binding rights and powers with respect to a relationship with the
companies that trade and retail its coffees. With trademarks secured, the Ethiopian coffee
sector can achieve more equitable leverage in this process of dialogue and planning.
[Trademarks] give Ethiopian coffee growers and exporters rights and therefore opportunities
they did not have before."); see also Posting of Douglas Holt to Coffee Politics,

http://poorfarmer.blogspot.com/ (Nov. 17, 2006). But see Justin Hughes, Coffee and
Chocolate: Helping Developing Country Farmers Through Geographical Indications (2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (divining contradictory reasons for Ethiopia's
decision).
114. Giovannucci & Ponte, supra note 22, at 289-90.
115. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 270 ("[Als many as [sixty] governments have
promulgated their own, often less stringent standards [than the International Federation of
Organic Agriculture Movement's]. Moreover, the United States, Japan, and to a lesser
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FAO, and the
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) to
Outside of intergovernmental
harmonize organic agriculture. 116
cooperation, standards may coalesce when a single standard-setting firm
becomes dominant or if firms are encouraged to cooperate toward umbrella
standards in the public interest (with or without the cooperation of17a public
agency) without fear of being accused of anticompetitive conduct.
In an ideal system, firms should be rewarded more explicitly for making
standards more transparent. A strong incentive should be provided to link
standards to CMs, which could be licensed broadly, whether for a royalty or
on a royalty-free basis. 118 Conversely, firms should be discouraged from
standards that are
private, proprietary
completely
developing
problematically opaque and potentially unlicensed. These changes would
address the twin dangers of lack of accountability and lack of transparency,
explored at greater length below in the context of conventional domestic
doctrine.
2. Accountability
The present guidelines and practices of the USPTO, as well as judicial
interpretations of the Lanham Act, give great leeway to firms to set
standards. They demand, however, very little of the registrant in the way of
additional information to the market in the form of the content or potential
Moreover, consumer input is
oversight of the standards themselves.
minimal or minimized.
A trademark signifies the commercial source of a good or service.
Historically, the function of a trademark has been distinct from the question
of standards, except in the context of licensing to related companies. While
this is doctrinal dogma, it may be time to reconsider the signaling function
of a trademark so that it includes private standards that may be adopted by a
firm, regardless of licensing.
extent Europe, appear to have developed their organic agriculture regulations with relatively
little reference or deference either to the IFOAM standards or to each other." (citations
omitted)).
116. INT'L TASK FORCE ON HARMONIZATION & EQUIVALENCE IN ORGANIC AGRIC.,
COMMUNIQUE FROM THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL TASKFORCE MEETING (2008).
117. The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 provides for a
number of incentives and safe harbors for SSOs, including the evaluation of their conduct
under an antitrust rule of reason. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (2006).
118. Giovannucci & Ponte, supra note 22, at 289 ("One of the clear signals emerging

from market surveys is that retailers in both the US and Europe would like to see simpler
messages for consumers. They would also prefer single sustainability labels that cover both
social and environmental aspects. [Moreover, s]ustainable coffee initiatives have limited
systems of monitoring and evaluation. Often, they cannot consistently and accurately
document levels and distribution of benefits that accrue to various actors in the value
chain."); accordKAREN ELLIS & MICHAEL WARNER, OVERSEAS DEV. INST., IS THE TIME RIPE
FOR A GOOD FOR DEVELOPMENT PRODUCT LABEL? 1 (2007), available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/odi-publications/opinions/88-karen-ellis-michael-wamergood-for-development.pdf.
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By contrast, certifications are thought to be the domain, not surprisingly,
of certification marks. The Lanham Act defines a CM as,
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof(1) used by a person other than its owner, or
(2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other
than the owner to use in commerce and files an application to register
on the principal register established by this chapter,
to certify regional or other origin, material,mode of manufacture, quality,
accuracy, or other characteristics of such person's goods or services or

that the work or labor on the goods or
services was performed by
119
members of a union or other organization.
Arguably then, CMs are more directly connected to standards and
certification, although those terms are not referenced in the statute per se.
With respect to the quality control dimension of trademarks and CMs, a
trademark owner can control the quality of a mark under voluntary license
agreements. A CM holder must control the quality of the standards not the
goods:
A trademark owner controls the nature and quality of the goods or
services under a license agreement. Unlike a trademark owner, a certifier
is not responsible for the nature and quality of the goods or services to
which the certification mark is applied. A certifier guarantees certain
qualities or characteristics of the goods or services but does not
guaranteethe nature and quality of the goods or services themselves. The

trademark and service mark
owners continue to be responsible for their
120
own goods and services.
Moreover, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) has provided the
following insight:
[T]here is a basic difference in the concept of a [trade]mark which is used
through related companies and a certification mark. This involves the
right of a licensor to choose the licensees that use its [trade]mark as
against the obligation of the owner of a certification mark to certify the
goods or services of any person who meets
and maintains the standards
12 1
and conditions which such mark certifies.
Thus, trademark holders have more autonomy in choosing licensees,
whereas CM holders are under an obligation to license to any firm that
122
meets its stated standards.

119. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added).
120. Terry E. Holtzman, Tips from the Trademark Examining Operation: Certification
Marks: An Overview, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 180, 183 (1991) (emphasis added).

121. In re Monsanto Co., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 864, 870 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (emphasis
omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(D).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(D); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 19:92 ("This
obligation distinguishes a certification mark from a trademark and creates a kind of
compulsory licensing"); Holtzman, supra note 120, at 183.
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12 3
The USPTO's requirement for a description of standards is flexible.
While the registration application for CMs requires a "copy of the
standards" and the criteria used to determine whether a product or service
will in fact be certified, 124 the actual level of detail required is not
126
specified.' 2 5 It requires that the standards be attached to the application,
but the language of the issued registration itself is quite general. 127 Once
the registration issues, neither the USPTO nor any other public agency
regularly oversees the "origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality,
accuracy, or other characteristics"-i.e., the standards supposedly
represented by a CM.
The closest thing to oversight of standards guaranteed by CMs is
provided by section 14(5)(A) of the Lanham Act. However, even this is
somewhat attenuated. A petition to cancel registration may be "filed ...by
anyperson who believes that he is or will be damaged,"' 128 if the CM owner
"does not control, or is not able legitimately to exercise control, over the
use of such mark."' 129 "[A]ny person" having standing to file such, a
petition definitely includes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).' 30 A
rule-making attempt by the FTC over standards and certification from the
late 1970s to the mid-1980s ended in an impasse, with the FTC deciding to
proceed on an ad hoc basis in its oversight activities. 13 1 It is unclear

123. J. Thomas McCarthy gives an example of CMs functioning as geographical
indications (i.e., Parma ham), whereby the specific process and standards for certification
remain quite vague by the very terms of the U.S. registration. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, §
19:91, n.16.
124. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE ch. 1306.06(g)(ii) (5th ed. 2007), available at, http://tess2.uspto.gov/tmdb/tmep/
[hereinafter USPTO TME] ("The applicant (certifier) must submit a copy of the standards
established to determine whether others may use the certification mark on their goods and/or
in connection with their services." (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.45 (2007))). For an intent-to-use
application, under section l(b) of the Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). The standards are
submitted with the amendment to allege use or the statement of use. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.45(b).
The standards do not have to be original with the applicant. They may be standards
established by another party, "such as specifications promulgated by a government agency,
or standards developed through research of a private research organization." USPTO TME,
supra, § 1306.04.
125. Alan Oskowski, Certification Marks: Should the Federal Government Regulate
Standards Protecting the Consumer? (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
126. See, e.g, State of Idaho Potato Comm'n, U.S. Trademark Serial No. 77335656 (filing
date Nov. 21, 2007).
127. See U.S. Green Bldg. Council, U.S. Trademark Serial No. 77199331 (filing date
June 6, 2007) ("The certification mark, as intended to be used by authorized persons, is
intended to certify that an individual or organization has met the educational, experience,
and ethical standards adopted by the U.S. Green Building Council.").
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (emphasis added).
129. Id. § 1064(5)(A); see also Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The
Spirited Debate About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 299, 310 (2006)
(discussing common-law rights in regional certification marks).
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 ("[T]he Federal Trade Commission may apply to cancel on the
grounds specified in paragraphs (3) and (5) of this section ....").
131. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 19:91 n.7 ("[I]n an end to the F.T.C.'s eight-year
attempt to lay down rules for the setting of private product standards and use of certification
marks, the Commission voted in 1985 to terminate its standards and certification rulemaking
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whether "any person" also includes a consumer as well as the traditional
injured competitor. 132 In the context of geographical indications (GIs), the
USPTO has recently stated ambiguously that "[c]ompetitors and
and
consumers-those with the greatest interest in maintaining accuracy
13 3
high standards-ensure that certifiers maintain the requisite quality."'
In a leading case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed a finding that a CM owner adequately controlled its mark through
a decentralized process of setting product standards that required firms
using the CM to engage in their own testing to ensure compliance with the
standards. 134 In that case, the CM owner also employed its own inspectors
to ensure that the firms were in fact carrying out testing in an adequate
manner. 135
The Court established a "reasonableness" standard for
determining whether a mark owner has exercised the requisite control so as
to prevent cancellation of a mark. 136 It stated that "[t]he 'control'
requirement of [the Lanham Act] means the mark owner must take
reasonable steps, under all the circumstances of the case, to prevent the
public from being misled."' 137 The court further defined "control" to be
"such control as is practicable under all the circumstances of the case" and
38
that the sufficiency of control is a question of fact. 1
Another basis for cancellation is if the CM holder "engages in the
production or marketing of any goods or services to which the certification
mark is applied."' 39 If dual usage of marks were permitted, certifiers might
be allowed to compete directly in the market in which they are establishing
standards, compromising the objectivity of the CM holder or even the
certifier.140 Further, the source-identifying function of the mark would be

proceeding. Henceforth, the F.T.C. said that it would proceed in such matters only on a
case-by-case basis.").
132. Halicki v. United Artists Comm'ns Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987)
(finding that only competitors have standing to allege unfair competition under section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act).
133. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Geographical Indications, Protection,
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/globalip/gi-protection.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2009) ("With respect to protection of geographical indication certification marks, affected
parties can oppose registration or seek to cancel registrations, all within the existing
trademark regime in the United States. So, if a party believes that the certifier is not
following its own standards or is discriminating by denying use of the mark to a qualified
party, that party can file an opposition or cancellation proceeding against the certification
mark or an action in federal court.").
134. Midwest Plastic Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 906 F.2d 1568, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
135. Id. at 1569-70.
136. See Holtzman, supra note 120, at 186.
137. Midwest Plastic Fabricators,906 F.2d at 1572.
138. Id. at 1573.
139. See In re Monsanto, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 864, 870 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (denying
registration of a mark as a certification mark even though it performed a certification-mark
function because a similar mark was registered as a trademark).
140. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 19.94.
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blurred, and a possible unfair competitive edge would result. 14 1 In In re
FloridaCitrus Commission, the TTAB stated that,
there was a continuing deep concern on the part of the framers of the
Statute over the possible use of the certification mark as weapon to create
a monopoly in a particular field and to perpetuate a fraud upon the
purchasing public .... To permit the indiscriminate use of a certification
mark with different goods or services will only lead to the dilution and
impairment of the purpose and function of a certification mark as well as
to practices wholly inconsistent with the public desirability of
safeguarding 142
the consuming public from confusion and damage not of its
own making.

However, the TTAB in In re Monsanto also noted that a party is permitted
to market goods or services and, at the same time, run a certification
143
program, so long as certain conditions are met.
It is fair to state that accountability over the substantive aspect of
standards is not a rigorous design feature of the Lanham Act. Features
relevant to standards are largely procedural. Even the control provision of
section 14 is largely ornamental; very few if any mark holders have lost
their marks through a finding of lack of control. 144 Despite the "any
person" language, enforcement of "control" by competitors or by public
agencies has not been particularly rigorous or vigorous. The current
categories of "abandonment"--lack of use, naked license, estoppel by
acquiescence-do not account for standards. Both the abandonment and
control doctrines have been undertheorized with respect to the growing
embodiment of standards within marks.
It is not obvious whether consumers have standing under section 14 of
the Lanham Act. Legislative history in the context of proposals for
heightened FTC enforcement suggests that Congress briefly considered but
did not resolve this question. 145 The only direct means of consumer
oversight is by voting with dollars-presumably by refusing to purchase

141. As stated by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in In re Monsanto,

the owner of a certification mark cannot use said mark in connection with goods
and services of its manufacture or design to certify their quality or accuracy-the
objectivity of a certifier as reflected by the certification mark would obviously be
lacking and therefore the use of the mark would be misleading.
201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 864.
142. In re Fla. Citrus Comm'n, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 498-99 (T.T.A.B. 1968).

143. In re Monstanto, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 869.
144. Telephone Interview with Deven Desai, Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson Sch.
of Law (Sept. 22, 2008).
145. TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, supra note 110, at 14-81 (statement of
Sidney A. Diamond, Assistant Commissioner for Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office,
U.S. Department of Commerce) ("[T]he standing of consumers to petition for cancellation of
generic marks is ... dubious. Obviously, too, litigating a trademark case can be enormously
expensive, and each consumer has relatively little financial stake in cancellation. Without
public counsel to represent the interest of consumers and potential competitors, their voice in
generic trademark litigation would be faint indeed.").
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products marked with false certifications. 146 And yet, whether a CM is
infringed is judged by the standard consumer confusion test.1 47 In the
context of certifications of GIs, the TTAB has explicitly "rejected the
argument that a designation cannot be deemed to be a certification mark
unless the public is expressly aware of the certification process which
controls use of the designation."' 148 This admixture of a "source of origin"
infringement test with CMs leaves a hole within the Lanham Act with
respect to the accountability of mark holders over the standards represented
by their marks.
3. Transparency
Except for geographically descriptive CMs (i.e., GIs), distinctiveness is a
14 9
requirement for federal registration of both trademarks and CMs.
Nonetheless, the purpose of even distinctive CMs is to attribute
characteristics to a good or service, rather than to differentiate among
competing goods and services. CMs do not, and in fact must not, indicate
commercial source or distinguish goods of one producer from those of
0
another. 15
It is theoretically possible that competing standards (through competing
151
marks) can stake out differential semiotic values vis-d-vis each other.
However, without dominant industry standards, consumers can experience
lack of transparency in at least two ways: lack of accessible information
about the substance of standards and informational clutter when many
competing standards exist. The dilemma of navigating between these two
transactional costs can be illustrated through the example of GIs.
In the wake of TRIPS, commentators have focused on GIs as a specific
type of CM.152 Both kinds of CMs-whether GIs as source of "regional...
origin" or CMs generally as a source of "other origin, material, mode of
manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics,"' 153 are deeply

146. The doctrine of CMs gives consumers another avenue of indirect impact. The
question of whether the mark should be registered as a CM depends on whether the
consumer views it as a certification as opposed to conveying some noncertified characteristic
of the good or service. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 19:93.
147. Institut Nat'l Des Appellations d'Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1875, 1885-89 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
148. MCCARTHY, supra note 24, § 19:91 (citing Institut Nat'l, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at

1885).
149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(2), 1054 (2006).
150. USPTO TME, supra note 124, § 1306.01(b).
151. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of TrademarkLaw, 51 UCLA L. REv. 621, 643
(2004).
152. See, e.g., Tomer Broude, Taking "Trade and Culture" Seriously: Geographical
Indications and Cultural Protection in WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 623 (2005);
Hughes, supranote 129.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (providing the definition of CM).
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implicated in global trade. 154 While this essay is not about GIs per se, the
treatment of GIs-particularly the standard-setting process underlying
designation of a particular food, wine, or spirit as a GI-is pertinent. One
issue is whether the proliferation of GIs actually assists rather than confuses
consumers in the marketplace. 155 A challenge of "too much information"
faces both sustainability standards and GIs.
Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes minimum standards for
the protection of GIs in member countries.1 56 Article 22 defines geographic
indications as "indications which identify a good as originating in the
territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially
attributable to its geographical origin."'157 Under Article 22(2) of the
TRIPS Agreement, TRIPS members are required to provide the legal means
for interested parties to prevent,
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that
indicates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical
area other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the
public as to the geographical origin of the good;
(b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the
meaning of Article lObis of the Paris Convention (1967).158

With regard to paragraph b above, Article 1Obis of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property ("the Paris Convention") prohibits the
use of any GI that "in the course of trade is liable to mislead the public as to
the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics,the suitability
for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods."' 159 Since CMs can be used
to indicate geographic origin in a manner consistent with the TRIPS
definition of geographic indication, the United States complies with both
Article 22 of TRIPS and l0bis of the Paris Convention.
Justin Hughes closely analyzes the domain of CMs as applied to
agricultural products. He recognizes that underlying standards can be
transmitted to the consumer alternatively through the vehicles of
trademarks, CMs, or GIs. He compares the French approach to wines,
which is a highly bureaucratic and centralized GI system referred to as
Appellation D'Origine Controllee (AOC), to the decentralized U.S. system
154. As McCarthy puts it, "[w]ith a growing world market in foodstuffs, accurate
identification of the geographic origin of food and beverages has become of increasing
importance." McCARTHY, supranote 24, § 14:1.
155. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 129, at 346 (noting that France's share of the global
wine market has decreased in inverse proportion to the increase of wine GIs).
156. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 22.
157. Id. art. 22, para. 1 (emphasis added).
158. Id. art. 22, para. 2(a)-(b). The TRIPS Agreement also provides heightened
protection for wines and spirits. Specifically, under Article 23, geographic indications may
not be used for wines and spirits even if the public would not be deceived. See id. art. 23,
para. 1.
159. See Paris Convention, supra note 110, art. 1Obis, para. (3)3 (emphasis added); see
also Hughes, supra note 129, at 317.

2340

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

of CMs and trademarks focusing on grape varietals. Arguably, the AOC
approach offers the most stability in informational meaning to consumers
because any change to the wine standards and labelling have to be approved
by a governing body, the Institut National des Appellations d'Origine
(INAO), a unit of the French ministry of agriculture. These relatively rigid
controls on wine labels imply that consumers have more opportunities to
learn how to read these labels and thus would acquire more relevant
information about wines and their underlying standards.
However,
ironically, the opposite has occurred-the French are losing market share of
the worldwide market because the labels have become too difficult for even
the French to decipher. 160 The AOC labelling apparently adds little useful
information to many consumers and in fact may be confusing and even
6
"intimidating."' 1
These observations are relevant to the parallel area of sustainability
standards. The proliferation of standards and their increasing complexity
mean that consumers may require a certain level of market signaling about
the standards in order to have confidence and trust in their purchases.
Labels and marks can provide some of that information. Informational
clutter, however, can be overwhelming and can lead to consumers opting
out of a particular system or market. The question is how to optimally
convey information regarding standards about which consumers care.
Labels and marks162stand for "something" but it is not always clear what that
"something" is.
In the context of sustainability initiatives in coffee,
Daniele Giovannucci has noted,
One of the clear signals emerging from market surveys is that retailers in
both the United States and Europe would like to see simpler messages for
consumers. They would also prefer single sustainability labels that cover
both social and environmental aspects.
[Moreover,] [s]ustainable coffee initiatives have limited systems of
monitoring and evaluation. Often, they cannot consistently and accurately
document levels and63 distribution of benefits that accrue to various actors
in the value chain. 1
Citing to the eighty-percent consumer recognition of the "JUAN VALDEZ"
mark, Hughes points out that certification marks functioning as GIs can be
164
an effective way to convey quality to a large number of consumers.
160. Hughes, supra note 129, at 337, 346.
161. Id. at 337.
162. See Giovannucci & Ponte, supra note 22, at 289.
163. Id.

164. Hughes, supra note 129, at 370 ("The oldest post-World War II development of
reputational capital for a developing world GI is surely the forty year campaign by the
National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia to convince North American coffee
drinkers of the superiority of their country's coffee. Their success is measured not just by
95% of American coffee drinkers being aware that Colombia grows coffee, but also by the
fact that the trademark avatar of their efforts, JUAN VALDEZ[,] ....

for 80% of Americans.").

is a household name
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Apart from the success of Colombia's marketing campaign, however, the
question whether the consumers recognize what kinds of standardsunderlie
this mark is a completely different matter. When standards enter the
picture, the tension between not providing enough information through a
mark and providing too much information requires careful calibration.
II. CONSUMERS AS REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURS

Decentralized rather than top-down approaches toward promoting social
welfare are encouraged by the neoliberal trade framework, characterized by
the "decline of state intervention and of market regulation and the rise of
NGO-led development projects."' 65 This pluralistic framework can be
normatively attractive in that it has the potential to promote grassroots
participation, the inclusion of local knowledge, and flexibility-all
elements of institutional design that have been advocated for a healthy
development model through intellectual property. 166 As stated earlier,
effective functioning of this model depends on the motivation of regulatory
entrepreneurs, who may consist of a variety of entities including consumers.
However, there are also possible costs and pitfalls to this decentralized
model, including where to locate points of accountability, participation, and
transparency within this heavily privatized global neoliberal framework.
This section first sets forth a case study of coffee standards and
certification. It then connects this example to larger global governance
issues of due process and development. It concludes with suggested
directions in domestic doctrine, to connect the regulatory dots in a more
discerning fashion.
A. Coffee

The coffee industry provides a relatively textured case study of how
standards, certifications, and marks can operate, because of the recent surge
in academic interest in evaluating this subset of fair trade. 167 Coffee is one
of the first internationally traded commodities for which sustainability
standards emerged through collective, voluntary efforts. It is also a
commodity that starkly illustrates the divide between southern producers
and northern consumers. Virtually all coffee is produced in developing
countries, and most of the importing countries are the wealthier, relatively
more industrialized countries. 168 Coffee is the second-most heavily traded

165. FRIDELL, supra note 15, at 94.

166. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property 'from Below ": Copyright and Capabilityfor
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803 (2007) [hereinafter Chon, Copyright]; Margaret
Chon, A Substantive Equality Principle in InternationalIntellectual Property Norm-Setting,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,

TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:

STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INA TRIPS PLUS ERA 475, 479 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007).
167. See generally FAIR TRADE, supra note 13; FRIDELL, supra note 15.

168. Chile and some South Pacific islands are coffee importers; otherwise the vast
majority of coffee importers are high-income countries. See Coffee Imported per Country in
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commodity globally, after oil. 169 And yet the average $3.00 latte in the
United States provides less than two cents to the coffee farmer. 170 A
worldwide glut of coffee, as well as newer processing techniques, have
resulted in a decrease in coffee commodity prices since the collapse of the
International Coffee Agreement in 1989.171 Since then, the price of coffee
has consistently decreased, to a thirty-year low of forty-five cents per pound
in October 2001.172 By contrast, the fair trade price guaranteed by FLO73
certified coffee is currently $1.21 per pound (with a ten-cent premium). 1
In addition to the labor issues associated with coffee farming, coffee
implicates environmental issues:
Coffee is farmed on about 12 million hectares (30 million acres)
worldwide, an area larger than Portugal and nearly the size of England.
Most of the farms are in areas regarded as high priorities for conservation.

For more than 150 years, coffee was widely grown under the leafy
canopy of native rainforest trees. [A]gronomists in the 1970s began
promoting a new farm system where the sheltering forest is cleared, and
coffee bushes are packed in dense hedgerows and doused with
agrochemicals. These monoculture farms produce more beans, but at a
tremendous environmental cost. 174

Efforts to address these harsh economic and environmental realities have
resulted in a plethora of different labelling organizations and initiatives.
Many have noted the confusion over these various competing sustainability
SSOs. 175

FLO International is considered by most to be the leading

international SSO for fair trade coffee; Equal Exchange is a U.S.-based
alternative. 176 Rainforest Alliance is another major SSO, focusing on
environmental aspects of coffee. 177 These organizations are NGOs or
alternative trade organizations (ATOs); other SSOs are industry alternatives

2005,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Coffee-Imported-perCountry_in_2005%28US
DA%29v2.png (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
169. Douglas L. Murray & Laura T. Raynolds, Globalization and Its Antinomies:
Negotiating a FairTrade Movement, in FAIR TRADE, supra note 13, at 9.
170. Id. at 86.
171. Id. at 139.
172. FAIRTRADE FOUND., THE ARABICA COFFEE MARKET 1989-2007: COMPARISON OF
FAIRTRADE AND NEW YORK PRICES (n.d.), http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadminuser-upload

/content/Arabica_Price_Chart_89-07_01 .pdf.
173. FAIRTRADE LABELING ORGS. INT'L, FAIRTRADE MINIMUM PRICE AND FAIRTRADE

PREMIUM

TABLE

5-6

(2009),

http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user.-upload/content/Feb09

available

at

FairtradeMinimumPrice_a

ndPremium_TableEN.pdf.
Agriculture,
http://www.rainforest174. Rainforest
Alliance,
Substance
alliance.org/agriculture.cfm?id=coffee (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
175. See, e.g., Catholic Relief Services, What's the Deal with the Seals?,
http://www.crsfairtrade.org/coffee/certified.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
176. Equal Exchange, http://www.equalexchange.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
177. Rainforest Alliance, http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
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to fair trade (e.g., UTZ-certified). 178 More recent initiatives include direct
trade coffee, which attempts to minimize costs by eliminating third-party
certifiers as well as the middle portion of the distribution chain by buying
79
directly from producers. 1
Some labels and marks signify certification of fair trade goods; others
signify relationships or networks among fair trade producers, bearing
acronyms such as World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO), 180 Fair Trade
Federation (FTF), 181 or FINE. 182 Some of these fair trade organizations
183
have registered marks (e.g., Transfair USA); others, such as FTF, do not.
84
1
Some independent labels for retail coffee are 100% fair trade certified;
others purchase a certain percent of FLO-certified coffee but also have their
own proprietary standards implemented through CSR programs. 185 Some
coffee suppliers have no certification link to FLO International but purport
to be governed by social justice principles similar to those advanced by
it. 186 Some certified fair trade coffees are also double-certified organic. 187
As stated previously, the organic area as well has been particularly plagued
88
with competing standards and certifiers. 1
Literally thousands of fair trade organizations (using the term loosely)
exist, most of which cooperate to some extent with FLO International
and/or other large fair trade networks (e.g., Ten Thousand Villages). Most
coffee organizations participating in fair trade are small, often consisting of
individual retailers, wholesalers, roasters, importers, or producer
associations and cooperatives. In addition to these NGO or industry
association efforts, individual for-profit firms are increasingly engaging in
178. Utz-Certified, http://www.utzcertified.org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
179. Counter Culture Direct Trade is an outgrowth of Fairtrade and, unlike the direct
trade model, does rely on certifiers. It differentiates itself from Fairtrade by offering a much
higher premium to farmers.
180. World Fair Trade Organization, http://www.wfto.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
181. Fair Trade Federation, http://www.fairtradefederation.org/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2009).
182. FINE is an informal organization of the four main international trade networks
(Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, International Fair Trade Association,
Network of European Worldshops, and European Fair Trade Association).
183. The Fair Trade Federation (FTF) label signifies "membership in the Fair Trade
Federation, an organization of wholesalers and retailers committed to uphold the Fair Trade
principles ... in all their trading relationships." Catholic Relief Services, supra note 175.
184. See, e.g., Pura Vida Coffee, http://www.puravidacoffee.com/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2009).
185. See, e.g., STARBUCKS CSR REPORT, supra note 78.
186. See, e.g., Madre Monte and Coffee, http://www.madremonte.com/Default.aspx (last
visited Feb. 18, 2004).
187. Byers et al., supra note 14, at 7 (discussing double certification).
188. Id. at 3; see, e.g., Final Meeting of the UNCTAD-FAO-IFOAM International Task
Force on Harmonization and Equivalence in Organic Agriculture (ITF), Geneva,
Switzerland, Oct. 6-7, 2008 (ITF Agreements); U.S. Department of Agriculture, National
Organic Program, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template
=TemplateA&navlD=NationalOrganicProgram&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=
NOPNationalOrganicProgramHome&acct=nop
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009) ("The
Department of Agriculture accredits the certifying agents (foreign and domestic) who inspect
organic production and handling operations to certify that they meet USDA standards.").
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CSR-driven initiatives. 189 For example, Starbucks is the single largest
purchaser of FLO-certified coffee, although the FLO-certified coffee still
constitutes less than two percent of its entire coffee output. 190 The
difference between the original activist approach to coffee certification and
the newer marketing approaches has led to the suspicion that,
the space so slowly won by fair trade practitioners for transforming the
international commodity chain may be captured by agro-food
corporations able to transform this progressive initiative into a niche
marketing scheme for products re-packaged under "green" [and/or]
"ethical" symbols.... This leads to the situation where consumers may
believe a company to be a fair trade practitioner (labeling used to brand),
whereas in reality a small percentage of its product lines are actually
bought under the terms of fair trade labeling. The challenge for the fair
trade is to maintain stringent fair trade standards whilst competing against
19 1
the entry of transnational companies using weaker fair trade standards.
Thus fair trade mark holders must compete against multinational
advertising and relatively large marketing budgets of firms that may have
their own competing standards. 192 On the other side of the political coin,
the decision of FLO International to work toward ISO 65 (an international
standard for bodies operating product certification services) has been
somewhat controversial within the fair trade social movement because these
"principles of nondiscrimination mean that [it] cannot distinguish between
one producer and another, or one trader and another. This potentially opens
the gate for any conventional company to enter Fair Trade, regardless of
their background and motivations." 193 The upside of this broad licensing
strategy, however, is that the FLO International-controlled marks might
exert an influence against information clutter created by competing multiple
standards.
Though the various domestic labelling initiatives play a predominant role
managing the use of the marks within their respective nations, FLO
International is responsible for developing and reviewing the standards to
which participating producers and traders are held. It also sees its mission
as facilitating and developing fair trade business as well as making the case
189. FARNWORTH & GOODMAN, supra note 40, at 10-11 ("In the UK the Ethical Trading
Initiative's Base Code was developed by a consortium of companies, trades unions and
NGOs anxious to improve working conditions and human rights in the workplace. Although
codes like the ETI Base Code focus chiefly on organized labor-and hence on workplace

practices rather than trading standards-some actors, including several supermarkets, are
embracing codes of conduct.").
190. Interview with Dub Hay (Jan. 5, 2006) (estimating around one percent of coffee sold
by Starbucks is FLO-certified and sold under the Starbucks Caf6 Estima brand and the
premium paid to Transfair as ten cents per pound).
191. FARNWORTH & GOODMAN, supra note 40, at 11.
192. TRANSFAIR
U.S.A., 2005
ANNUAL
REPORT
(2005), available at
http://www.transfairusa.org/ content/Downloads/AnnualReport2005.pdf.
193. See Stephanie Barrientos & Sally Smith, Mainstreaming Fair Trade in Global
Product Networks: Own Brand Fruit and Chocolate in UK Supermarkets, in

supra note 13, at 103, 118-19.

FAIR

TRADE,
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for trade justice. 194 FLO International publishes its standards on its
website, and posts updates to those standards as changes occur. 195 As
described previously, the USPTO
is minimally involved in regulating the
196
content of these standards.
An independent third-party certifier, FLO-Cert GmbH, based in Bonn,
Germany, is responsible for holding inspections and enforcing the
standards. As stated earlier, the split between the standard-setting function
of FLO International and the certifying function allows it to be more
compliant with ISO international standards. 197 FLO-Cert performs both
physical and "desktop" (i.e., paperwork) inspections of producers and
traders on a regular basis. The regularity, duration, and intensity of the
inspections depend upon the size, location, and level of risk of the operator
being inspected. The level of risk is calculated via an unpublished "risk
matrix."1 98 FLO-Cert keeps nearly all producer-specific and trader-specific
information confidential. Therefore, there is no public record of when or
how any individual inspection was made. Nonetheless, there appears to be
some rigor to its certification processes, in that there are reports of
decertification. 199
From a producer perspective, the standards both include and ignore
farmers' interests. There is evidence to support the claim that the fair trade
premium does have a positive impact on farmer livelihood through the
value added to commodities.2 00 On the other hand, critics commonly
charge that standards tend to exclude producer input and/or form barriers to
entry for developing countries because of the cost of complying with the
certifications, which is primarily borne by the suppliers (farmers,
processors, and exporters). 20 1 One FLO standard that has come under fire
from within the fair trade movement is its insistence on working with
farmer associations like cooperatives, rather than with individual
farmers. 20 2 As Cathy Farnworth and Michael Goodman put it,
194. FLO International, FLO's Main Tasks, http://www.fairtrade.net/tasks.html
visited Feb. 20, 2009).

(last

195. FLO International, Standards http://www.fairtrade.net/standards.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2009).

196. In the UK, "Fairtrade" is not a certification mark; it is registered as a trademark.
WEDF Notes, supra note 19 (information from Harriet Lamb).
197. See Laura T. Raynolds & Michael A. Long, Fair/AlternativeTrade: Historicaland
EmpiricalDimensions, in FAIR TRADE supra note 13, at 19.
198. FLO
International,
The
Fairtrade
Certification
Mark,
http://www.fairtrade.net/certification-mark.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
199. MURRAY ET AL., supra note 13, at 12 (describing two cooperatives that had been
decertified); WEDF Notes, supra note 19 (estimating that ten percent of certifications are not
recertified).
200. See Byers et al., supra note 14, at 3.
201. See id. at 2.
202. See, e.g., Counter Culture Coffee, Counter Culture Direct Trade,
http://www.counterculturecoffee.com/index.php?option=com-content&taskview&id=594&
Itemid=88 (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (This standard excludes large numbers of farmers, and
has led to the formation of "Counter Culture Direct Trade." This latter organization is a
licensee of Transfair USA but also independently certifies farmers that do not meet the coop
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Questions like "Who are standards for?" "How, and by whom, are they
created?" "How are they maintained?" are important. There is much
tension involved in the development of standards, and the indicators used
to measure them.
The intended beneficiaries-smallholders and
workers-sometimes see them as exclusionary, unrealistic and imposed
by stronger stakeholders.... Producers in developing countries are
concerned that the development of new labels may form yet another
barrier to entry into20the
European market, along with technical and health
3
protection barriers.
The Ethiopian Coffee Network chose to work as a "first-party certifier"
through trademark ownership rather than working through a certification
mark or fair trade model. 20 4 Thus it chose to rely on standards not set by
third-party SSOs. This is a model of "value-added" that is increasingly
205
being chosen by firms or governments based in the developing world.
From a consumer perspective, specific certification standards can be
found on the websites of the larger SSOs, but they are not available in a
form that provides meaningful shorthand to consumers. 20 6
Thus, a
consumer will have to engage in a fair amount of research to compare and
contrast the various standards. To the extent that marks are supposed to
function as cognitive shortcuts for fair trade processes (e.g., minimum price
supports, democratic decision making, ecological practices, gender equity),
do they and can they convey those signals effectively to the consumer?
B. Due Process and Development
Adequate global accountability may be lacking among all of the
institutions engaged in global governance, and accountability itself should
be looked at as a comparative phenomenon. Thus, one should expect the
attributes of accountability for nonstate actors to be different than for states
or others. 20 7 In regard to standards, the OTA has stated that,
Due process ... is not a constant. Agreement about what is a fair and
open standardization process changes over time and in different
circumstances. Today, the rapid advance of technology, the shift to a
global economy, the rise of user groups, and the desire to substitute
voluntary standards for regulation
will likely put the issue of due process
20 8
into much starker relief.

membership requirement, and sets minimum prices that exceeds the fair trade certified
minimum by nineteen percent.).
203. See FARNWORTH & GOODMAN, supra note 40, at 10.
204. Ethiopian Coffee Network, About the Trademark and Licensing Initiative,
http://www.ethiopiancoffeenetwork.com/about.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
205. See MURRAY ET AL., supra note 13, at 24.
206. My very able and motivated research assistants spent many hours discerning the
differences among coffee standards, based on publicly available information on the Internet.
207. Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 29 (2005).
208. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 18 (emphasis omitted); see also id. ("Due process
issues are inherent in standardization. Safeguards must be built into the process, because
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As Meidinger notes, these multistakeholder governance systems "are best
understood as compound accountability systems, resting on... open and
transparent decisional procedures, and dynamic competition among
'209
certification programs for business and public acceptance.
Nonetheless, while accountability may be different for nonstate actors
than for public agencies, many observers have noted that the nature of
standard setting may leave too much discretion in the hands of selfinterested firms. While it makes sense for standards to be set in part by the
firms involved in the relevant industries, it is not equally sensible that they
should be the only actors involved in enforcement through certification.
Additionally, meaningful opportunity for consumer and producer
involvement in the standards must be provided.
The case study of coffee illustrates some of the pitfalls of these
approaches to regulation of knowledge goods. Private standards and CSR
alternatives not only raise questions about industry capture, but also of
clutter in the signals, which Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse view as
a type of "regulatory inefficiency." 2 10 Private standard setting in the
sustainable forestry area have led to regulatory competition between one
major NGO and an industry substitute.2 11 By contrast, the multiplicity of
signals in the agrifood marketplace suggests possible limits to alternative
governance. They raise questions not only of "what is sustainable trade"
but also what we mean by "civil society." The general history of private
standard setting within the United States shows domination by corporate
interests, and even a relatively recent OECD report expressed ongoing
2 12
unease with the possibility of private capture of de facto regulation.
Furthermore, while competitive standards may be useful (one size of
standard may not fit all), 213 a plethora of standards may lead to an
"anticommons" analogy to patent law in the informational market created
by trademark law. Standards also raise issues of informed consent or
choice of participation in forms of political economy-whether designated
as "alternative trade," "fair trade," "corporate social responsibility"
programs, or mainstream trade.
Developing countries and their
manufacturers and users can use standards to set prices and constrain trade. In a pluralistic
society such as the United States, competition and countervailing forces provide such
safeguards. It is assumed that no one party can dominate the standards setting process
because it is transparent and everyone can participate.").
209. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 284.
210. Id. at 278.

211. Id. at 261 (alliances centered around the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) versus
the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification); see also Misty L. Archambault,
Making the Brand, Using Brand Management to EncourageMarket Acceptance of Forestry
Certification, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1400, 1408 (2006) (explaining differences between FSC

and the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI)).

FSC is a certification promulgated by the

NGO sector as opposed to SFI being pushed by trade associations. See id.
212. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 59, at 228-29 (citing ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: SYNTHESIS (1997), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/25/2391768.pdf).
213. Chamovitz, supra note 26, at 13.
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stakeholders have complained about the anticompetitive effects of
standards, even sustainability standards, especially in areas where they may
have a comparative advantage, such as agriculture or labor costs.
This has
2 14
been evident, for example, in the debate over "eco-labelling."
The fierce debate over TRIPS and development illustrates that one size
may not fit all, especially with beyond the borders standards. 2 15 Therefore,
regulatory diversity as well as regulatory competition among different
standards should be encouraged. Yet decentralized, privatized standard
setting through certifying firms-while posing a different model from the
"top-down" global framework of TRIPS-may or may not contribute
robustly to an intellectual property "from below," which builds innovation
capacity from and for human development,
local freedom to design systems
2 16
of innovation, and access to knowledge.
C. DoctrinalDirections
How can the U.S. trademark and unfair competition law be tweaked to
improve the global governance mechanisms created by these certifications
of standards? From a consumer perspective, which lies at the heart of
trademark law's consumer confusion test, he or she must be able to trust
what a mark symbolizes. If a mark is supposed to represent quality via
standards and certification, then the current framework clearly lacks
mechanisms for accountability to those standards. What possible changes
to the statutory framework might encourage greater accountability and
transparency? I suggest very briefly a few creative possibilities.
More information about standards could be demanded as a quid pro quo
for registration on the federal register for both trademarks and CMs and
especially for enforcement of any mark, registered or not. The rise of
wholly proprietary standards also suggests a principle of nondiscrimination
between trademarks and CMs. That is, to the extent that a firm is
promulgating standards that are arguably integral to a product's mark
through its marketing regime, those standards should be disclosed as
prerequisite to registration or to enforcement of the mark. Perhaps a
separate searchable register for standards associated with registered marks
would allow consumers to find information relatively efficiently.
Conditioning registration and/or enforcement of rights on disclosure would
be one method of leveraging information technology to create more access
2 17
to standards based on consumers' right to information about standards.
Moreover, to the extent that standards are not followed consistently, or
certifications are proved to be false, the doctrines of "abandonment" under
214.
215.
L. REV.
216.
217.

ROTHERHAM, supra note 16, at 15, 18.
See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO
2813, 2833-34 (2006).
Chon, Copyright,supra note 166.
Tom Rotherham suggests a right to information. ROTHERHAM, supra note 16, at 12-

14. Leveraging information technology and disclosure as a quid pro quo for protection is an
alternative to address the same question.
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section 14(3) and "control" under section 14(5) of the Lanham Act 2 18
suggest templates for expanding the quality control roles of trademarks,
collective marks, and CMs. Where a mark is unregistered or where
common-law rights have accrued, courts should be willing to recognize the
existence of a mark-as well as be willing to overcome their antipathy
toward canceling a mark if necessary. 2 19 Furthermore, in order to ensure
that a firm's stated standards indeed are substantively enforced, whether by
itself or through a third-party certifier, an expanded doctrine of trademark
misuse (where intentional deceit or outright fraud is involved) could be a
basis for nonenforcement of a mark.
Finally, a generous view of standing would allow a consumer (through
class actions or through a consumer protection association) to bring an
action against licensees that do not meet the standards represented by a
CM. 220 Concomitantly, the consumer confusion test for infringement can
and should be modified to allow challenges to a mark under section 43(a)
that would take into account fraud or deceit with respect to certification of
standards. Another possible expansion is a qui tam provision, similar to the
current version in the Patent Act, to address false marking; such a provision
could address either the actions of the certification mark holder or its
licensee in failing to police standards correctly. 22 1 Perhaps as well, a
statutory damages provision (analogous to that provided in the Lanham Act
for violations of its domain name provisions) would obviate the need for
calculation of damages or lost profits, which would be difficult in a
2 22
consumer class action.
While these proposals may seem immodest, the proliferation of standards
and certifications are black boxes that current trademark law does not
address adequately. These more expansive interpretations would be
consistent with our obligations under Paris Convention Article 7bis(2),
which states with respect to collective marks that "[e]ach country ... may
refuse protection if the mark is contrary to the public interest.

'22 3

They are

also consistent with the broader notion of unfair competition set forth in
Paris Convention Article 10bis(3) regarding "indications or allegations the
use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead the public as to the
218. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), (5) (2006).
219. Jordan S. Weinstein, Inter Partes Cases II, 98

TRADEMARK

REP. 22 (2008)

(discussing general unwillingness to cancel marks in a case about control over the CM
"Darjeeling," Tea Board of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2006)).

220. The rise of NGOs makes this plausible. As stated earlier, the legislative history
regarding "any person" suggests that the statute could be read broadly. See generally
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, supra note 1 10.
221. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2000); cf Bookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Total Containment, No.

04-1150, 2006 WL 1896065, at *8 (W.D. La. July 7, 2006) (finding no cause of action based
on promissory estoppel against the certification mark holder and holding that "[t]he
application of a certification mark to a particular product constitutes a declaration of the
manufacturer-not a representation of the registrant of the certification mark").
222. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
223. Paris Convention, supra note 110, art. 7bis, para. (2).
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nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for
their purpose, or the quantity of the goods." 224 While U.S. courts have split
over how this international unfair competition provision is incorporated
within section 44 of the Lanham Act, 22 5 section 43(a) permits a liberal
construction.
Changes are necessary to both the Lanham Act as well as the judicial
doctrines of trademarks and CMs to address these global regulatory shifts.
More specifically, more accountability and transparency are required for
these newer regimes of quality assurance. 226 These proposed changes
would promote the consumer protection function of certificationscurrently not being enforced steadfastly by any government agency.
CONCLUSION: THINKING AND ACTING GLOBALLY

The ascendancy of standards is part of a discernable pluralistic trend in
global intellectual property, which includes several notable features:
(1) new normative actors (or the de-centering of the state); (2) new
normative domains (or the de-centering of intellectual property's master
narrative of innovation and of international law's focus on public or socalled formal "hard" law); and (3) new normative 227
directions (the decentering of a one-way, top-down regulatory process).
To the extent that normative pluralism has been discussed in the
international intellectual property literature, it is usually in the form of
states' "regime shifting" between and among intergovernmental
organizations (e.g., between the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and the WTO). 228 Here, I suggest that the nature of pluralism in
standards extends very deeply into the nongovernmental "private" side of
norm setting, involving nonstate actors such as NGOs, industry or producer
associations, various levels of government (including within developing

224. Id. art. lObis, para. (3)3.
225. General Motors Corp. v. Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 689 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (endorsing a broad construction of unfair competition within section 44 pursuant to
Paris Convention article lObis); cf Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1956) (rejecting a broad construction).
226. Outside of these proposed changes to the Lanham Act, other means such as
distribution of knowledge to consumers and to small developing country producers through
information technology are important. One of these initiatives is the Committee on
Sustainability Assessment (COSA), which is a joint project of the Sustainable Coffee
Partnership and the International Trade Centre. See The Committee on Sustainability
Assessment (COSA), http://www.iisd.org/standards/cosa.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
227. Margaret Chon, Global Intellectual Property Pluralism and the Domains of
Development, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Rochelle

Dreyfuss, Harry First & Diane Zimmerman eds., forthcoming 2009).
228. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
InternationalIntellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 42 n. 186 (2004); cf
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564, 571 (2000)

(defining forum-shifting and suggesting that it is a game that only the powerful states can
play).
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countries), regional coalitions, and other stakeholders.2 29 Consumers'
interests have been underemphasized in this regulatory scheme.
The U.S. trademark and unfair competition law casts a long but uneven
and overly weak shadow over international certification and standard
setting. In particular, through overdelegation of quality assurance of private
standards to first-, second-, and third-party certifiers, the law has not
encouraged consistent quality, accountability, or transparency. Soft law
initiatives such as standardization through certification and labelling should
address the increasing intertwining of private and public, national and
international, as well as commercial and social justice domains of law.
Trademark law can and should facilitate meaningful marks of rectitude by
harnessing consumer involvement and oversight.

229. Meidinger, supra note 11, at 273-76.
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